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"It is not good for trade unions that they should be brought
in contact with the courts, and it is not good for the courts.'",
Sir Winston Churchill
"The unions should take the position squarely that they are
amenable to law, prepared to take the consequences if they
transgress, and thus show that they are in full sympathy with
the spirit of our people whose political system rests upon the
proposition that this is a government of law, and not of men." 2
• ' Mr. Justice Brandeis
On this silver anniversary of the enactment of the Taft-Hartley
amendments to the National Labor Relations Act of 1935,3 one no
longer hears its provisions denounced, as they were, by the leaders
of organized labor as a "slave labor" act. The Act, which made col-
lective bargaining agreements enforceable in court,4 prohibited sec-
* This article benefited from the criticisms of Sir Geoffrey Howe, Solicitor General
of the United Kingdom, Professor Cyril Grunfeld, Counsel to the Commission on Indus.
trial Relations, and Professor Norman Selwyn, University of Aston, Birmingham, England.
Of course, the views expressed are my own and should not be attributed to any of the
individuals mentioned.
The author wishes to express gratitude to Lynn Coe, Harvard Law School, '72, and
member of the State Bar of Washington, for his generous assistance.
- A.B. 1958, University of Rhode Island; LL.B. 1961, Cornell University; Graduate
study 1962-1963, London School of Economics; Professor of Law, Stanford University;
Visiting Professor of Law 1971-1972, Harvard University.
1. TRADE UNION DocumiE"rs 380 (Milne-Bailey ed. 1929).
2. Congressional Record, Senate, April 20, 1947, quoted in 2 LEGLATIvE Hisron" oF
THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELAIONS Acr, 1947, at 1145-46.
3. Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, ch. 120, §§ 101 et seq., 61 Stat. 136 [herein-
after cited as LMRA or Taft-Hartley Act] amending The National Labor Relations Act.
1935, ch . 372, §§ 1-16, 45 Stat. 449 [hereinafter cited as NLRA]. The NLRAk has been
further amended by The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959,
Pub. L. No. 86-257, §§ 1 et seq., 73 Stat. 519. These statutes are codified at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 141 et seq. (1970). Compare the silver anniversary discussion of Raskin, Taft-Hartley
at 25; How It's Worked, N.Y. Times, June 18, 1972, at I with views of George Mean)',
President of the AFL-CIO, id.
4. LMRA § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
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ondary boycotts5 and closed shops,0 placed authority in the Attorney
General to sue to enjoin for an eighty-day period strikes which cre-
ated a national emergency, 7 was anathema to the unions. When Adlai
Stevenson, making the first of two losing passes at the presidency, re-
pudiated past Democratic Party pledges, and stated that lie would
not repeal Taft-Hartley but would only propose its amendment,8 he
was the first Northern leader of his party to state the unthinkable,
and not merely think it. The United States would never again seri-
ously contemplate turning away from the legal regulation of trade
unions in a modern interdependent economy.
What is particularly significant in this regard is trade union ac-
ceptance of the role of law in industrial relations and the labor
movement's acquiescence in the propriety of some portions of Taft-
Hartley as representing something quite different from a return to
the bad old days which trade unionists legitimately fear. To be sure,
some of the provisions adopted by the 80th Congress in 1947 still
rankle-and quite properly so." But organized labor in the United
States is alive and well. To the extent that it has problems in or-
ganizing the unorganized, the primary blame lies with the unions
themselves, 10 not with the law.
Far from evolving into repressive legislation, much of Taft-Hart-
ley is of benefit to American trade unions. Nothing was more re-
sponsible for the "slave labor" charge than the emergency strike pro-
visions of Taft-Hartley. Yet today, trade union leaders advocate re-
tention of existing Taft-Hartley procedures in this area, and propose
their application to public employment labor disputes.11 Because of
the comprehensiveness of the statute's unfair labor practice provisions,
5. NLRA § 8(6) 4(B), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1970).
6. NLRA §§ 8(a)(3), (b)(4), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(3), (b)(4) (1970).
7. LMRA §§ 206-10, 29 U.S.C. §§ 176-80 (1970).
8. Actually, after receiving the Democratic nomination, Governor Stevenson retreated
to the rhetoric of repeal, but his speeches and press conference comments reveal ac-
ceptance of some of Taft-Hartley's provisions. See A. STEVENSON, MAJOR CAMPAIGN SrEnCII-
Es OF ADLAi E. STEVENSON 1952, at 46, 157; N.Y. Times, July 31, 1952, at 9.
9. NLRA § 14(b), 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1970) permits states to prohibit any union
security arrangement requiring membership or the payment of dues to the collective
bargaining representative and, accordingly, precludes labor and management from
making their own agreement on this subject and weakens the union as a bargain-
ing entity. Further, some of the limitations on organizational and recognitional picket-
ing dull union organization weaponry which are a legitimate part of the arsenal. Sec,
e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1970).
10. One proof of this proposition is the continued growth of the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters against whom most of Taft-Hartley is aimed. See R. JAMEs
& E. JAMES, HOFFA AND THE TEAMSTERS 143-58 (1965). The Teamsters succeed simply
because they do the best job of organizing workers. On weaknesses plaguing American
unions, see generally S. BARKIN, THE DECLINE OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT (1901).
11. See T. Kheel, Report to Speaker Anthony J. Travia on the Taylor Law, Feb. 21,
1968, which was met by favorable trade union reaction.
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the doctrine of pre-emption has ousted the states' jurisdiction over a
wide variety of problems relating to strikes and picketing and thus
removed the potential for large awards of compensatory and punitive
damages against unions.12 When it comes to the enforcement of col-
lective agreements, it is the unions, supposedly the objects of discipline
for their irresponsible failure to abide by contractual obligations,
which have been plaintiffs in the overwhelming majority of court pro-
ceedings and grievants in most of the arbitrations.13
Last year, the British Parliament passed the first comprehensive
legislation relating to labor management relations in the United King-
dom. The legislation attempted to both restrict union abuses in the
collective bargaining arena and provide statutory protection for unions
and employees. The Industrial Relations Act of 1971, which is more
comprehensive than all of the major labor legislation enacted by Con-
gress in 1935, 1947 and 1959 viewed together,' 4 establishes a wide va-
riety of unfair industrial practices applicable to both unions and em-
ployers, 15 prohibits the "unfair" dismissal of employees,' 6 introduces
an obligation requiring employers to bargain with an exclusive or
"sole" bargaining representative17 and prohibits the right to strike in
a number of contexts. It makes collective agreements legally enforce-
able for the first time,' 8 and it puts great pressure on the unions to
"'register"19 with the government, and thereby to specify which union
officers shall be liable for breaches of collective contracts and of statu-
tory obligations. An abiding theme of the Act is the encouragement
of central union authority which, in turn, will be more attuned to re-
sponsibilty and orderliness in its dealings with employers.20
Thus, from an almost exclusive reliance on "voluntarism," i.e., the
promotion of negotiating procedures drawing at most indirectly upon
law, Great Britain has now imposed upon the conduct of unions and
12. See Garner v. Teamsters Local 66, 346 U.S. 485 (1953); San Diego Bldg. Trades
Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959); Teamsters Local 20 v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252
(1964). But see Internat'1 Union v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958); United Constr. Workers v.
Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
13. See, e.g., Aaron, Judicial Intervention in Labor Arbitration, 20 Sr. L. REv. 41
(1967).
14. See note 3 supra. On American and European labor law generally see Summers,
American and European Labor Law: the Use and Usefulness of Foreign Experience, 16
BuFrFALo L. REv. 210 (1966).
15. Industrial Relations Act 1971, c72 [hereinafter cited as Ind. Rela. Act 1971],
§§ 5, 13(2), 16, 22, 33(3), 56, 54, 55, 66, 70, 96-98, 130. I have discussed the Con-
servative Government Industrial Relations Bill prior to amendment in Gould, Unions
on a Legal Leash, The Guardian Weekly (Manchester) Jan. 23, 1971, at 7, col. 1.
16. Ind. Rela. Act 1971, §§ 22-26.
17. Ind. Rela. Act 1971, §§ 50, 55.
18. Ind. Rela. Act 1971, § 34.
19. See pp. 1437-40 infra.
20. See, e.g., Ind. Rela. Act 1971, § 36(2).
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employers more formal and far-reaching regulations than those char-
acterizing the U.S. system, a system which British experts traditionally
regarded as excessively law-ridden. Moreover, where the U.S. system
represents a gradual accretion of statutory and ever-changing case law,
and where gradualness has allowed labor and management here to
adapt to the system, the British have attempted an abrupt, mammoth,
one-step codification. The suddenness of change contributed to caus-
ing political and social upheaval. The summer of 1972 in Great Britain
was one of nearly unprecedented bitterness and tumult. Not since the
Conservative Government's repeal of the Trade Disputes Union Act
of 1913 in 1927, and the Labor Government's repeal of the 1927
law in 1946, has labor law figured so prominently in the national
political arena.21 Not since the General Strike of 1926 has Britain
moved so near a total collapse of civility.22 While government inept-
ness in administering the statute, an unfavorable judicial ruling,23 and
ever-worsening unemployment and inflation have aggravated the tur-
moil, the hard feeling arising out of the summer's railway and dock
strikes is largely attributable to the Act itself. Although some promi-
nent beneficial by-products of statutory intervention in industrial rela-
tions are already visible-i.e., an accord between labor and management
establishing a conciliation and arbitration service 24-the unions remain
totally committed to avoiding all involvement with the Act's institu-
tions and, along with the British Labor Party, to pressing for repeal
of the statute.25 The jailing of five dockers for contempt of court "
21. The Conservative Party, however, had spoken of repealing the Labor Party's
1946 repeal. See H. LASKI, TRADE UNIONS IN THE NEw SocIETY 57 (1950).
22. See the worried comments of both Lord Devlin and the London Times: Deviii,
Politics and the Law: A Matter of Judgment, The Sunday Times (London), August 6,
1972, at 14, col. 2; Yes, We Are In Danger, The Times (London), July 28, 1972, at
17, col. 1.
23. See the Court of Appeal's decision in Heaton's Transport Ltd. v. Transport and
General Workers Union, [1972] 2 All E.R. 1237 which was, however, reversed by the
House of Lords, [1972] 3 All E.R. 101. For some of the pessimistic commentary that
followed the Court of Appeal's decision see Hanna, Two Ways to Salvage Union Law,
The Sunday Times (London) June 25, 1972, at 57; Elliott, industrial Relations After Two
Big Tests in Court, The Financial Times (London) June 14, 1972, at 16, col. 3.
24. See Routledge, Employers Sign Deal With TUC for Independent Conciliation,
The Times (London), August 3, 1972, at 1, col. 1; Howell, TUG and CBI Unveil Joint
Peace Service, The Financial Times (London), August 3, 1972, at 1, col. 6.
25. See LABOUR PARTY, STATEMENT ON INDUSrRIAL RELATIONS (1972). This has been said
to set "the terms of the Labour Party's total surrender to the demands of its trade
union paymasters." Wood, Trade Union Rights, But No Duties, The Times (London)
July 31, 1972, at 13, col. 1. See also Rogers, TUC and Labour Plans to Replace I.R. Act,
Financial Times (London) July 28, 1972, at 7, col. 4. For an account of recent trade
union strategy against the Act, see pp. 1485-86 infra.
26. Midland Cole Storage Ltd. v. Turner and Others, The Times (London), July 22,
1972, at 31, col. 1. See also Jacobs, Dockers Caught In The Act, The Sunday Times (Lon.
don), July 23, 1972, at 12, col. 1; Shuster, Angry British Workers Testing New Labor Law,
N.Y. Times, July 24, 1972, at 3, col. 5; Shuster, Heath, Unions Adamant as British Strikes
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may be just the beginning of a long struggle between a trade union
movement, both obstinately resistant to the law and anxious for po-
litical combat with Prime Minister Heath and a Conservative Gov-
ernment determined to make good on election promises given in 1970
and before.27
This article does not purport to explain, or to apportion blame for,
Britain's current industrial crisis. Compared to the peaceful accept-
ance by American unions of legal innovation in the labor-managemefit
field, the British crisis will afford intriguing parallels and contrasts in
years to come for sociologists, political scientists, and historians. The
task here, however, is a more modest one: to examine those provisions
of the British Industrial Relations Act which resemble, in language
or function, important provisions of the National Labor Relations
Act in the United States. British critics and advocates of the Act all
borrowed heavily,28 though not always accurately,29 from the Ameri-
can experience, and the Act can fairly be regarded as a highly selec-
tive transplant of American labor law. This article highlights the selec-
tions which were made and considers their wisdom in light of peculiar
British traditions and problems.
The First Section gives the American reader a very brief, and neces-
sarily incomplete, tour of British labor law and labor management prac-
tice prior to passage of the Industrial Relations Act. The Second Sec-
tion introduces some of the novel institutions and concepts created by
or used in the Industrial Relations Act. The Third, and main, Section
discusses central issues raised by the Act upon which the American ex-
perience supplies provocative comment: (a) The Recognition of Union
Bargaining Units and the Establishment of Collective Bargaining, (b)
Union Security Arrangements, (c) The Enforcement of Collective
Agreements and the Right to Strike, (d) The Secondary Boycott Prob-
lem, and (e) Emergency Dispute Procedures.
Spread, N.Y. Times, July 25, 1972, at 3, col. 1; Shuster, Britain Facing Industrial Pa.
ralysis in Labor Dispute, N.Y. Times, July 26, 1972, at 1, col. 5; Shuster, Wide Strike Peril
Eased in Britain, N.Y. Times, July 27, 1972, at 1, col. 1. Apparently there was discus.
sion in TUC quarters about not only a one day general strike against the dockers' jailing.
but also a general strike against the Act. See Paterson, 1926 and All That, NEW STAS-
mN, Aug. 4, 1972, at 150.
27. See, e.g., FAiR DEAL AT WORK: THE COsERVATIVE APPROACH TO INDUSTIAL RELA-
TIONS (1968); Carr, The Unions: What the Tories Would Put in Place of Strike, The
Sunday Times (London) June 22, 1969, at 12, col. 1; Clark, Union Chiefs Challenged by
Heath, The Times (London) April 7, 1970, at 1, col. 2. For a discussion of the contending
points of view on the eve of the 1970 election, see Gould, Book Review, 48 TEXAs L. RMv.
987 (1970).
28. See, e.g., P. LowRy, THE GRAss is Gm .FR (1970).
29. See, for instance, the comments of former Prime Minister Harold Wilson as re-
ported in Lewis, Commons Backs Plan to Reform Labor Relations, N.Y. Times, Dec. 16,
1970, at 1, col. 1. See also 810 PA.. DEn. H.C. 839 (1971) (comments of Eric Helfer).
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I. The Background and Setting
Until 1971, law played a remarkably small role in the British system
of industrial relations. The state intervened, with some exceptions,
only to provide a floor-in terms of wages, safety, health, etc.-below
which employees could not be forced. The rules of the game between
labor and management were written, and refereed, by the parties them-
selves. It was, as Professor Kahn-Freund has said, a system of "collective
laissez-faire."30
At one time, however, the British interfered on a large scale with the
employer-employee relationship in a manner which repressed workers
and which favored the entrepreneurial class. These policies can be
traced to the Black Death of the Fourteenth Century, when a badly
shaken economy prompted adoption of the Statute of Laborers31 to im-
pose criminal and civil liability upon employees who, taking advan-
tage of a shortage of labor, refused to accept "pre-plague prices." As
Dean Landis has noted, the aim of such measures was to "strike at the
individual bargaining power" of the workers involved.3 2 Similarly, in
placing the Combination Acts of 1799 and 18003S on the books, Parlia-
ment was not the least bit bashful (albeit sometimes quite unsuccess-
ful 34) about attempting to thwart the first stumbling efforts to estab-
lish something akin to what we now call the collective bargaining
30. To Professor Kahn-Freund,
collective laissez-faire [means] . .. allowing free play to the collective forces of
society, and limiting the intervention of the law to those marginal areas it
which the disparity of these forces, that is, in our case, the force of organized
labour and of organized management, is so great as to prevent the successful op.
eration of what is characteristically called 'negotiating machinery.' It so happens
that in this country, this principle of, if you like, 'collective laissez-faire' comes to
be a preponderant characteristic of labor law of the first half of this century.
0. KAHN-FREUND, LABOUR LAW (reprint), p. 224. The system has, however, permitted more
legal intervention than Professor Kahn-Freund's comments would lead one to believe.
Prompted by the emergency of World War II, compulsory arbitration in the last resort
existed between 1940 and 1951. See generally McCarthy, Compulsory Arbitration in Brit.
ain: The Work of the Industrial Disputes Tribunal, 31, RESEARCH PA'ERS No. 8, ROYAL
COMMIssION ON TRADE UNIONS AND EMPLOYERS AssOCIATIONS (1968). McKelvey, Coninpul.
sory Arbitration in Britain, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 403 (1952). However, as Professor Kahn-
Freund has said: 1[I]n so far as it worked at all, it worked as a result of this under-
standing, and one government after another emphasized that it would be terminated
if either side of industry desired this. Without this political background the system
cannot be understood." 0. KAIN-FREUND, LABOUR AND TIlE LAW 116-17 (1972).
31. Statute of Labourers, 25 Edw. 3, Stat. 1 (1350) confirming the emergency Ordi.
nance of Labourers, 23 Edw. 3 (1349).
32. J. LANDIS AND M. MANOFF, CASES ON LABOR LAw 2-3 (2d cd. 1942).
33. Combinations of Workmen Act, 39 & 40 Geo. 3, c.81 (1799); Combinations of Work.
men Act, 39 & 40 Geo. 3, c.106 (1800).
34. See S. WEBB & B. WEBB, THE HISTORY OF TRADE UNIONISM (2d ed. 1920). As one
authority summarized: "The Act of 1800 was in reality the last prop of the already de-
cayed wage-fixing system, and while it achieved its object of crushing workers' trade
unions in some trades, it was ineffectual to prevent combinations, either of workmen or
masters in other." M. HICKLING, CITRNE's TRADE UNION LAw 6 (3rd ed. 1967).
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process. These statutes were repealed in 1824 and 1825, thus making
the mere combination of workers no longer illegal (although the right
to strike was curtailed by the 1825 statute). But, in Britain, as in the
United States,35 the courts subsequently used the law of conspiracy to
impose both tort and criminal liability upon workers bold enough to
resort to economic pressures against employers with whom they could
not resolve their differences.3 6 Such liability was eliminated in Britain
by the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act of 1875,3T the Trade
Union Act of 187138 (which declared that a trade union was not an un-
lawful restraint of trade for criminal or civil purposes), and the Trades
Disputes Act of 1906.39
Although narrowed by recent House of Lords rulings,4 0 the 1906
statute became the cornerstone of trade union legislation in Britain.
Not only did it make the civil law of conspiracy inapplicable to labor
disputes,41 but it also legalized peaceful picketing and the calling of
strikes and supposedly conferred immunity from court actions on any-
one who induced an individual to break his contract of employment in
the context of a "trade dispute."
42
35. For a review of this early use of the law of conspiracy see C. GREGORY, CASES AND
MATERIA S ON LABOR LAW 3-79 (1941).
36. Id. For a brief and interesting discussion of this history see 0. KAi.N-FREUND, LA-
-BOUR AND THE LAw 167-72 (1972).
37. Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 38 & 89 Vict., c.86 (1875).
58. The Trade Union Act of 1871, 34 & 35 Vict., c.31.
39. Trades Disputes Act, 6 Edw. 7, c.47 (1906). The Act %%-as prompted by Taff Vale
Railway Co. v. Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants [1901] A.C. 426. Moreover,
while the criminal law as a means to control the strike was discouraged by the 1875
statute, the judiciary then turned its attention to tort law. For the discriminatory attitude
of the House of Lords, see Quinn v. Leathem, [1901] A.C. 495; Allen v. Flood, [1893]
A.C. 1. An excellent treatment of the British legal tradition in this respect is contained
in C. GRUNFELD, MODERN TRADE UNION LAw 886-404 (1966).
40. See, e.g., Rookes v. Barnard, [1964] A.C. 1129; Stratford & Son, Ltd. v. Lindley,
[1965] A.C. 269. See also Torquay Hotel Co. v. Cousins, [1969] 2 Ch. 100 (C.A.). Sub-
sequent to the House of Lords' decision in Rookes, the newly elected Labour Govern-
ment attempted to reverse some of its effects through the Trades Disputes Act of 1965,
c.48 (repealed by Ind. Rela. Act 1971, sched. 9). Earlier judicial intervention of a
different kind was countenanced by the House of Lords in Bonsor v. Musicians Union.
[1956] A.C. 104. Meanwhile, comprehensive legislative proposals were developing.
See, e.g., A New Law for Trades Unions? Some Proposals for Reform, Economist (Lon-
don), Feb. 8, 1964, at 482, col. 1; An Industrial Peace Board, Economist (London), OcL
6, 1962, at 21, col. 1.
41. Trades Disputes Act, 6 Edw. 7, c.47 (1906). Cf. Crofter Hand Woven Harris
Tweed Co. v. Veitch, [1942] A.C. 435. Compare United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381
US. 657 (1965); Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 881
US. 676 (1965); Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, IBEW, 325 US. 797 (1945); U.S.
v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1940). Allen Bradley demarcates the line of self interest for
unions under American labor law as does Crofter in British labor law. For further
clarification of the British view see Huntley v. Thornton, [1957] 1 W.L.R. 321 (Q.B.
1956); Scala Ballroom Ltd. v. Ratcliffe, [1958] 1 W.L.R. 105.
42. The 1906 act protected picketing so long as the conduct was peaceful. Trades
Disputes Act, 6 Edw. 7, cA7, § 2. The question of what constitutes peaceful picketing
can be troublesome. See Tynan v. Palmer, [1967] Q.B. 91 (1966); Piddington N. Bates,
[1961] 1 W.L.R. 162 (Q.B. 1960). Under both the 1906 and 1971 acts, producer picketing
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The Trades Disputes Act of 1906 was the Magna Charta of the
British labor movement. The American labor movement was still to
go through the Danbury Hatters43 experience of coping with anti-trust
damages imposed for the use of secondary boycotts deemed to be in
"restraint of trade."44 Also, the American judicially enunciated doc-
trine of "unlawful objectives," whereby judge-made law permitted the
assessment of damages in instances where economic pressure departed
from what was philosophically acceptable to the courts, was yet to
reach its zenith.4" Not until 1932, with passage of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act,40 were the American unions successful in dismantling the federal
judiciary's policy of indiscriminate and one-sided involvement in labor
disputes.
In comparing the two countries, it is important to understand that
by the 1930's American unions were unwilling and indeed unable to
settle for the same live-and-let-live bargain which British unions struck
in 1906 and adhered to for more than half a century. In Britain the
unions had gained industrial power before they were able to assert
their will in the political arena. Accordingly, they were fully content
for the law to stay out of their affairs: They did not require parlia-
mentary assistance at the bargaining table, and they feared that Parlia-
ment would not be an entirely friendly partner. For the emerging
CIO unions, by contrast, legislative help was vital, and available.
Fierce employer resistance, lack of solidarity amongst workers, ram-
pant unemployment in the Great Depression, the struggle of the newly
born unions to organize mass production industries from scratch-all
these factors made affirmative legal protection seem imperative to the
American labor movement. The result was the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, with its list of employer unfair labor practices and its obliga-
tion on management to bargain with an exclusive bargaining agent
representing a majority of workers in an "appropriate unit."47 The
statutory scheme, of course, was at variance with the "hands off" policy
is not protected. Compare NLRB v. Local 760, Fruit and Vegetable Packers, 377 U.S.
58 (1964). Under the 1971 act, picketing at an individual's home is not immunized
from suit. Ind. Rela. Act 1971, § 134(l)(b). Although Congress has seriously limited
the right to picket in this country, NLRA § 8(b)(7), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (1970), the
First Amendment protects it to some extent. Teamsters Local 695 v. Volt, Inc., 354 U.S.
284 (1957); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). Where a strike is unlawful,
picketing to support it in this country is condemned. The question is somewhat un.
clear in Britain. See Hamilton, Picketing Law to be Brought in Fine Focus by Court,
The Times (London), June 22, 1972, at 1, col. 3.
43. Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
44. Id. at 292-93.
45. See, e.g., Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
46. Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-64 (1970).
47. NLRA §§ 8, 9(a), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158, 159(a) (1970).
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of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, and with the same bias in the British
Trades Disputes Act of 1906.48
Owing their economic success to power rather than law, and relying
safely on the pride and prejudice of British "class" distinctions,40 Brit-
ish trade unions have, through the Trades Union Congress (the rough
equivalent of the AFL-CIO in this country), continued to express un-
yielding hostility toward any legal restraint upon trade union activity.
Enjoying relative success in organizing workers eligible for member-
ship in existing unions,50 the TUC has recognized little need for legis-
lative aid. It is thus entirely unremarkable that the British labor move-
ment has adopted a policy of "non-cooperation" with the Industrial Re-
lations Act.51
But the TUC's adherence to "collective laissez-faire," a position once
widely shared by the public, has placed it out of step politically32 and
has, arguably, injured the prospects of its ally, tie British Labor Par-
ty. Public pressure for legal intervention in labor-management rela-
tions has been building for some time. A compulsory arbitration sys-
tem was in force during World War II. Further, the Terms and Condi-
tions of Employment Act of 195953 provided for the imposition upon
a resisting management of the terms of a "relevant" bargaining agree-
48. More than a decade ago, Professor Kahn-Freund said of the British unlons:
"Does not their . . . unwillingness . . . to invoke the help of the law which, as is
well known, the American unions found to be of the greatest assistance, demonstrate
how much the aversion against State Intervention in industrial relations, how much
in particular union preference for industrial rather than political or legislathe action,
dominate the impact of public opinion on the development of labour law in our time?"
0. KAHN-FREUND, LABOUR LAW (reprint) 229.
49. See generally C. CROSLAND, THE FUTURE OF SOCIALISM (19i6); Kessler, Britain's
Docks and Henry Higgins, Wail St. J., Aug. 1, 1972, at 8, col. 3.
50. As of 1965, 28.5% of the non-agricultural employed labor force were union
members in the U.S. while 38.7% were organized in England, D. Bor. & J. DUnLOp,
LABOR AND THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY, 49 (1970) (note caveat at 49 as to problems with
statistical comparison of union membership among countries due to different standards
of measurement); for a comprehensive study of the growth patterns of British trade
unionism see G. Bain, Trade Union Growth and Recognition, RESEAncit PAPERS No. 6,
ROYAL COMMISSION ON TRADE UNIONS AND EMPLOYE' AssoclATIoNs (1967).
51. For representative accounts of the TUC's reaction, see Routledge, TUC Letter
Sets Union Style to Resist Registration, The Times (London) Sept. 24. 1971, at 3, col. 1;
Elliott, TUC to Tell Unions Still on Register to Leave Congress, The Financial Times
(London), August 22, 1972, at 1, col. 3; Wigham, Time Ripe for T.U.C. to Reconsider its
Policy, The Times (London) May 23, 1972, at 23, col. 1; Macbeath, Polities of Re-
sistance to the Unions Act, The Times (London), Aug. 6, 1971, at 12, col. 1; Raskin, Britain
Goes Through Taft-Hartley Pains, N.Y. Times, June 16, 1969, at 42, col. 3. The TUC
has now stated that unions may appear before the Industrial Relations Court to defend
themselves, i.e., where an "offensive action" is being taken against a union. GEEL
COUNCIL, REPORT TO THE 104TH ANNUAL TRADES UNION CONGRESS 86-87 (1972); Murray,
Mr. Jack Jones is Shattered by Disloyalty to TUC Policy of Boycotting the Industrial
Act, The Times (London) May 1, 1972, at 2, col. 7; Hamilton, Union's Appeal Over Dis-
missal First Before New Tribunal, The Times (London) May 4, 1972, at 4, col. 1.
52. See generally Pickles, Trade Unions in the Political Climate, ill INDusn.'L RE-
LATIONS, CONTEMPORARY PROBLIMS AND PERSPECTIVES (B.C. Roberts ed. 1962).
53. Terms & Conditions of Employment Act, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, c.26 (1959).
1429
The Yale Law Journal
ment and for incorporation of those terms in each worker's individual
contract of employment, the "relevant" agreement usually being read
as the pattern of practice in the industry involved. 4 The 1959 Act was
for the benefit of unions and employees,ra and the TUG accepted it
for that reason, but the Act represents a clear breach of the spirit of
"collective laissez-faire" which the unions now invoke. Indeed, to have
the substance of a collective agreement dictated by an outside body is
so inconsistent with voluntarism that it would not generally be toler-
ated in the seemingly more legally regulated American system. 0"
In 1959, therefore, labor's resistance to state interference gave way
to self-interest. This may partly explain why public opinion now shows
little sympathy for the trade union position. At any rate, the public
now appears convinced that the traditional, unregulated manner of
resolving trade disputes produces wasteful strikes and inflationary
wage settlements which Britain's foreign-trade-sensitive economy cannot
safely tolerate. Whether, and by how much, Britain's peculiar labor-
management procedures aggravate the inflation rate, retard the growth
rate, and worsen the foreign payments imbalance are matters of dis-
pute among economists."7 But, beyond question, Britain's procedures
are less organized, more acrimonious-at least in key export industries-
and considerably more complicated than America's. In no other coun-
try is trade union structure as deeply plagued with the consequences of
history. Without legislative rationalization, Britain's crazy-quilt multi-
union structure has grown like Topsy, small craft unions formed in
the mid-19th Century coexisting with large general unions arising
from the New Unionism of the 1880's and cutting across industries as
well as jobs.58 All this contrasts sharply with the United States where
54. Id. § 8.
55. In addition, of course, employers who have entered into collective agreements
through negotiations have an obvious self-interest in protecting themselves against"sweated" or substandard conditions.
56. NLRA § 8(d), 29 U.S.C.A. 158(d) (1970), while defining the obligation imposed on
employers and employee representatives, specifically provides that "such obligation does
not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession . . . ."
See NLRB v. American National Insurance Co., 343 US. 395 (1952). Cf. General Electric
Co., 150 N.L.R.B. No. 36 (1964), enforced, 418 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 965 (1970).
57. The relationship between union negotiated economic packages and inflation Is
a matter of considerable debate. See, e.g., H.A. CLEC, How To RUN AN INCOMES 'OLICY
AND WHY WE MADE SUCH A MESS OF THE LAST ONE (1971); F. W. PAisHl, RIsE AND FALL OF
INCOME POLICY (1971); O.E.C.D. THE PROBLEM OF RISING PRICES (1961); Dale, As Phase 11I
Approaches: The Virtuous Circle or . . . The Vicious Circle, N.Y. Times, August 27,
1972 (Magazine), at 12.
58. Britain's trade union structure is messy because there are a relatively large number
of unions competing for members and because many unions are not organized along any
definable industrial or skill lines, and thus represent different interest groups In dif-
ferent industries. See H. A. CLEG, THE SYSTEM OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN GREAT BRrr-
AIN 41-47 (1970); A. BRIGGS, Social Background, THE SYSTEm OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
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industrial unionism is well accepted, the CIO unions of the 1930's
having grown within the mold of the National Labor Relations Act
and according to its principles relating to representation.
In addition, Britain's post-World War II full employment economy
substantially eroded the collective bargaining authority previously
held by national trade union leaderships. As employers competed
for scarce labor-particularly in southeast England and the Midlands,
the areas of Britain's economic growth during this period-they began
to yield to the demands of unorganized "work groups" and shop
stewards. Power began to shift from the national leadership, which
was short of staff and technical assistance, to the sub-plant level, where
shop steward committees assumed de facto influence, although some
had no responsibility to any of the unions which were theoretically
authorized to bargain.59 Bargaining predictably became fragmented:
Management neglected to weigh the implications of the bargain for
employees in other sections of the plant. Within the plant, employees
represented by rival unions and/or work groups had every incentive
to agitate for relative gains, regardless of productivity considerations.00
The result was that industry-wide negotiations, traditionally a
major feature of the British industrial relations topography, became
the forum at which only minimum conditions were set, the important
IN GREAT BRITAIN (A. Flanders & H. A. Clegg eds. 1954); 0. KAiIN-FREUND, Legal Frame-
work, id.; Hughes, Trade Union Structure and Government, REsEAaCIi PAPERS No. 5,
ROYAL COMMISSION ON TRADE UNIONS AND EMPLoYERs' ASSOCATIONS (1957). This is at-
tributable to the proliferation of small craft unions in the previous century, which
were challenged but not entirely displaced by general and militant unions. See H. A.
CLEG, A. Fox, and A. F. THOMPSON, A HISTORY OF BRITIsH TRADE UNIONS SINCE 1889
55-96 (1964); THE TRADE UNION SITUATION IN THE UNrr KINcDOM, RETORT OF A MIS-
SION FROM THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR OFFICE 11-26 (1961). The contemporary weakness of
national union organization also has historical antecedents. See generally L. ULMAN, Til
RISE OF NATIONAL UNIONS (1960). The branch unions which evolved were less firmly
knit to the center as are local structures in the United States. Hughes, supra. For the
American situation, see generally L. SAYLES & G. SRAuss, TiE LOCAL UNION (rev. ed.
1967). This comparative weakness in formal union structure has provided British em-
ployers with more unilateral rule-making authority than is the case in the United
States. See 0. KAHN-FRtUND, LABOUR AND THE LAw 128 (1972).
59. REPORTI OF A COURT OF INQUIRY INTO THE CAUSES AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF A Dts-
PUTE BErvEEN THE FORD MOTOR COMPANY, LIMrrED, DAGENILM AND ME.MIBERS OF TILE
TRADE UNIONS REPRESENTED ON THE TRADE UNION SIDE OF TIlE FORD NATIONAL JOINT
NEGOTIATING ComtmrrrE, CMND. No. 1999 (1963); see generally H.A. CLEGG, A. KILUc
& R. ADAMS, TRADE UNION OFFICERS (1961); McCarthy, The Role of Shop Stewards, RE-
SEARCH PAPERS No. I, ROYAL COMMISSION ON TRADE UNIONS AND EMPLOYERS' ASSOCIATIONS
(1967); McCarthy and Parker, Shop Stewards and TVorhlshop Relations, RESEARCI PA-
PERs No. 10, ROYAL COMMISSION ON TRADE UNIONS AND EmPLOYo s' ASSOCIATIONS (1968). The
automobile industry poses some of the most troublesome problems in this regard. See
the treatment provided labor-management relations in this industry in H. TUR tR. F.
CLACK & G. ROBERTS, LABOUR RELATIONS IN THE MOTOR INDUSTRY (1967); Ensor, Why
Car-Plant Militancy is on the Increase, The Financial Times (London), Sept. 5, 1972,
at 16, col. 3.
60. See A. FLANDERS, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: WHAT IS WRONG wIMt TlHE SYSTEM? AN
ESSAY ON ITS THEORY AND FUTURE (1965); A. FLANDERS, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: PREsCuP-
TiON FOR CHANGE (1967).
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bargains being struck informally on the factory floor. This contrasts
with the United States, where formalized plant-level bargaining is
the rule and where, even in the case of industry or company-wide
bargaining, specific supplemental agreements are often negotiated for
a particular plant. The British pattern also fails to involve national
union officials in local plant bargaining to the extent common in
the United States or to require that negotiated contracts meet the
approval of national headquarters, a practice common in the United
States. This British "organizational gap," as Professor Stieber has
called it,61 encourages guerrilla type industrial strife, involving multi-
ple stoppages of short duration.
2
Also virtually unknown in the United Kingdom, though common in
America, are detailed collective agreements relating not only to em-
ployment conditions and benefits but also to grievance machinery.
Further, American agreements often provide for binding arbitration
of grievances by an impartial third party; 3 this is almost never the
case in Britain. While arbitration has by no means eliminated unau.
thorized stoppages or strikes in breach of contract in the United States,
the fact that a dismissed or abused employee, and his co-workers, are
aware of a process through which the claim can be equitably resolved
(providing, where appropriate, reinstatement and back pay) obviously
discourages resort to self-help in the form of walkouts or slowdowns.
In Britain, by contrast, there is no sharp distinction between rights
disputes over existing terms of contracts and interest disputes over
new contract terms, and arbitration is used rarely in either instance.0'
In Britain, procedural agreements (the handling of grievances is
known as the "procedural" part of the bargain in Britain) arrived at
in industry-wide negotiations have been increasingly ignored by em-
ployees and plant-level worker organizations. Such procedures typi-
cally take too long and do not provide for a final and binding resolu-
61. J. Stieber, Grievance Arbitration in the United States: An Analysis of its Functions
and Effects, RESEARCH PAPERS No. 8, ROYAL COMMISSION ON TRADE UNIONS AND ENI,
PLOYERS' ASSOCIATIONS (1967) at 27. See also LABOR RELATIONS AND TIlE LAW IN Tilt UNITED
STATES 64-69 (Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather and Geraldson developers 1968); Gould, Book
Review, 48 TEXAS L. REV. 987 (1970).
62. J. Stieber, supra note 61. But see J. KUHN, BARGAINING IN GRIEVANCE SEtTLEMENT
(1960); H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 96-125 (1970). Cf. Gould, Book
Review, 16 WAYNE L. REV. 384 (1969); Shapiro, Book Review, 22 STAN. L. REV. 657 (1970).
In the United States, national leaders keep a relatively close watch on most local dis.
putes. Cf. DEP'T OF LABOR, ANALYSIS OF WORK STOPPAGES 1965, at 11 (1966), Dn"'r OF'
LABOR, ANALYSIS OF WORK STOPPAGES 1961, at 9 (1962).
63. For a discussion of American arbitrators' remedies and functions, see F. ELKOURI S.
E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS (1960).
64. K. W EDDERBURN AND P. DAVIES, EMPLOYMENT GRIEVANCES AND DIsPUTES PROCEDUrS
IN BRITAIN 66-74 (1969). Marsh 8: McCarthy, Dispute Procedures in British Industry,
RESEARCH PAPERS No. 2, ROYAL COMMlISSION ON TRADE UNIONS AND EMPLOYERS ASSOCIA-
TIONS (Part I 1966, Part II 1968).
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tion of the problem. Thus, economic pressure has been exerted at
the plant level as a first rather than a last resort.
In 1965 public discontent with the inefficiencies plaguing labor-
management relations prompted Prime Minister Harold Wilson to
appoint a Royal Commission, chaired by Lord Donovan, to "[c]on-
sider relations between managements and employees and the role of
the trade unions and employers' associations in promoting the in-
terests of their members and in accelerating the social and economic
advance of the nation, with particular reference to the Law affecting
the activities of these bodies."' , In its report,00 three years later, the
Donovan Commission recommended legislation to encourage formal
plant-wide bargaining, which would result in detailed and precise
collective agreements; 7 particular stress was laid on negotiating specific
procedures to handle grievances. 68 The Commission recognized that
lack of rational union organization and discipline was part of Britain's
labor troubles: It found that ninety-five per cent of Britain's work
stoppages were engaged in without trade union authorization. 0 But
65. Royal Warrant dated April 8, 1965, set out in ROYAL Cosattsso. o% TPnE
UNIONS AND EMPLOYERs' AssocIArIoNs, REPORT, C.NIND. No. 3623, at I (1958) [hereinafter
cited as ROYAL COMM. ON TRADE UNIoNs, REPORT].
66. ROYAL Comm. oX, TRADE UNIONS, REPORT, supra note 65. A full treatment of all
legal issues is contained in Grunfeld, Donovan-The Legal Aspects, 6 BRIT. J. INDUSTRAL
RELATIONS 316 (1969).
67. Donovan found that Britain had in effect two systems of industrial relations, one
formal and the other informal: "[T]he formal system assumes Industry-wide organ-
isations capable of imposing their decisions on their members. The informal system rests
on the wide autonomy of managers of individual companies and factories and the
power of industrial groups." ROYAL COMM. ON TRADE UNims, REPORT, supra note 63,
at 36. Issues normally dealt with in American collective bargaining agreemLnts-such as
discipline, discharge, lay-offs, and work practices-were either ignored or handled in-
adequately in the industry-wide formal system, although some were dealt with informally
at the local level. The Commission further noted that the gap between the actual pay
packet in the plant and the rates set at industry-wide negotiations was continuing to
grow. The main solution suggested by the Commission was the negotiation of formal
and comprehensive collective agreements at the plant level. Id. at 50.
68. The Commission found a general failure of existing procedural agreements to
"cope adequately" with disputes arising in factories. As a result, informal and "frag-
mented" bargaining was the means through which differences were resolved; man)- is-
sues were left to "custom and practice." The Commission recomnended that procedure
agreements be comprehensive in scope so as to deal with disputes "whether they
refer to the interpretation of existing, or the making of new, agreements ... :' Id. at 50.
Donovan further recommended establishment of a Commission on Industrial Relations
to investigate and report on disputes concerning procedure agreements. As its central
objective, the Commission was to guide the parties to collective agreements covering
all employees in a company or factory under a single set of rules, a policy whid Dono.
van argued was the best solution to all recognition disputes between labor groups. Id.
at 51.
69. But see H. TuRNER, Is BRITAIN REALLY STmRE PRONE: A REvmw OF TIE INCI-
DENCE, CHARACTER & COSTS OF INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT (University of Cambridge Department
of Applied Economics, Occasional Papers No. 20, 1969). The trend now seems to have
shifted so that it more nearly resembles the American pattern. See Thomas, Britain's
Worst Year for Strikes since June 1926, The Times (London) Nov. 27, 1970, at 1, col. 1;
Macbeath, The Changing Face of the British Strike, The Times (London) Dec. 16, 1971,
at 23, col. 4.
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the Commission rejected the notion that law could play an activist
role in suppressing strike activity or enforcing collective agreements.
The Commission reasoned that it would be futile to make agreements
enforceable or to subject them to binding arbitration unless and until
the agreements referred to plant-specific issues and became sufficiently
comprehensive and detailed to bear impartial interpretation; 0 simi-
larly, it would be futile to impose liability for breach of agreements
on established unions or their officials, since the absence of orderly
grievance machinery made strikes inevitable, and since most strikes
were unofficial and were conducted by workers and stewards beyond
conventional union discipline.7 1 To sanction these unruly individu-
als, Donovan reasoned, would usually prolong and aggravate, not
eliminate, wildcat strikes.
72
Prior to the Commission's report, the Conservative Party issued its
own document, Fair Deal at Work,73 which envisioned a leading and
dramatic role for law in restructuring labor-management relations.
The collective agreement was to be a legally enforceable contract
unless the parties "specifically agreed that the whole, or parts of it,
should not be legally binding."74 Damages against employers would
normally consist of lost earnings or individual "entitlements," plus
expenses incurred by the union. Against unions, damages would be
specifically limited by statute. Responding to Donovan's conclusion
that union liability would place sanctions on the wrong party, and
would thus be futile, Fair Deal at Work suggested imposing liability
on unions only if they had failed to do "all in their power to pre-
vent" the particular breach of the collective agreementY5 Such a rule,
the Conservatives reasoned, would encourage negotiation of detailed
70. ROYAL CoMM. ON TRADE UNIONS, REPoRT, supra note 65, at 126.
71. Id. at 136.
72. This brief summary does not of course exhaust the Commission's important
findings of major recommendations. Among other things, Donovan also opposed out-
lawing the closed shop, id. at 162-64, and the secondary boycott, id. at 234.37; ex.
pressed doubts that balloting procedures should be used to test union opinion or to
determine inter-union jurisdictional issues, id. at 64-65; recommended that collective
agreements be registered with the government, id. at 191-202 so that defects it the
agreements could be studied; and suggested that Taft-Hartley's emergency strike pro-
visions would have little utility for Britain's work stoppage problems, id. at 122-25. On
this last point, the Commission reasoned that British strikes rarely threatened the na-
tional "health" or "safety" criteria which Taft-Hartley requires be met before invoca.
tion of emergency procedures. Id. at 113. This reasoning overlooked the peculiar vul-
nerability of Britain's foreign trade-dependent economy to strikes in key industries. For
a thorough study of Britain's economic posture at the time of Donovan, see generally
R. CAVES, BRITAIN'S ECONOMIC PROSPEcts (1968).
73. CONSERVATIVE POLITICAL CENTER, FAIR DEAL AT WORK (1968).
74. Id. at 32.
75. Id. at 33.
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agreements and would make the presence of national union leader-
ship felt once more on the workshop floor.70
In 1969, the Labor Government entered the debate with its white
paper, In Place of Strife.77 Like Donovan, the government opposed
making collective agreements enforceable. It recommended instead
that agreements be required to contain provisions relating to settle-
ment of grievance disputes and to set up arrangements for union-
management consultation on matters not specifically negotiated. A
Commission on Industrial Relations (CIR) was established by Royal
Warrant,78 in part to study and promote procedures for settling griev-
ance disputes.79 In its most controversial provision, In Place of Strife
recommended that the government have discretionary reserve power
to order a "conciliation pause" or "cooling off period" against strikes
declared in breach of collectively negotiated procedures or in cases
where no procedures were provided. 0
The Wilson Government was compelled to withdraw its legisla-
tive proposals because of trade union pressure on the Parliamentary
Labor Party."' Accordingly, after the Heath Government replaced it
in June of 1970, the stage was set for the national debate on the In-
dustrial Relations Bill. Although there was considerable doubt that
the new government would adhere to Fair Deal at Work immedi-
ately in the wake of the election, the government showed that
it was quite serious about making good on its campaign promises
with the submission of its Consultative Document in October, 1970.82
76. FAIr DEAL AT VoRiK, supra note 73, made other points. It urged outlawing the
closed shop, but recommended allowing the union shop to impose membership require.
ments on new employees and to require payment of equivalent of union dues into an
agreed fund. Id. at 24-27. The document advocated outlawing the secondary boycott or"sympathy strike." Id. at 30. The Conservatives further proposed that a legal duty to
bargain be imposed on an employer in the event that a majority of emplo)ees desired
union membership. Id. at 44-45. Finally, the Conservatives recommended that the
Minister of Employment and Productivity be empowered to impose a 60-day injunc-
tion during emergency strikes, with a ballot to be held, at the Minister's diasretion,
during the 60-day period on the employer's "last offer." Id. at 4041.
77. IN PLACE OF STRIFE-A POLICY FOR INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, CMND No. 3888 (1969).
78. Id. 33-38.
79. Id. 35.
80. IN PLACE OF STRIFE, supra note 77, made several other points. Like Donovan. it
urged registration of collective agreements with the government. Id. at 14-15. It wished to
obligate management to disclose certain sorts of information to unions which would
facilitate collective bargaining. Id. at 16. The secondary boycott and the closed shop
were to receive legal protection, id. at 30, 34, though conscientious objectors to union
membership would be permitted to pay a contribution to charity rather than dues to
the union. Id. at 34.
81. The best description of this episode is contained in P. JENKI Ns, TIM DATrLE OF
DOWNING STREET (1970).
82. DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT AND PRODUCTIVITY, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS BILL: CO\-
SULTATIvE Docu.ENTr (1970), reproduced in K. WIEDDERD uRN, Tim WoRER AND TIE
LAw 485-527 (2d ed. 1971).
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What emerged, however, was an amalgam of Donovan, Fair Deal at
Work, In Place of Strife, and more.
83
II. An Introduction to the Act
A. Institutions Created
The National Industrial Relations Court (NIRC) created by the
Act is given all the powers of Britain's High Court. It consists of both
judges and lay members, the latter having special knowledge or ex-
pertise in industrial relations. Complaints of unfair industrial prac-
tices,84 including disputes relating to the enforcement of collective
agreements as well as violations of employer duties,85 are to be adjudi-
cated by the NIRC within six (6) months of the time of the event. 80
The Court is to make awards that it considers to be "just and equi-
table." The Court has the power to compel attendance and examina-
tion of witnesses as well as the production of documents and it has
criminal contempt power to enforce its authority. Decisions of the
NIRC on questions of fact are to be final. However, on questions of
law, an appeal to the Court of Appeal is provided, as well as a further
appeal procedure to the House of Lords.
The Court also has certain responsibilities with regard to union
security arrangements, i.e., where the right to refrain from union
membership is concerned, and with regard to the enforceability of
procedure agreements. Moreover, the Court has appellate jurisdic-
tion over unfair dismissals, although the parties may devise their own
procedures in this area. In considering an application by the parties
to establish their own machinery in lieu of that of the Industrial
Tribunals 7 (which have primary jurisdiction over unfair dismissals),
the Court must determine whether the procedure agreement negoti-
ated is as beneficial to the employee as are the provisions of the Act.88
The Court also has some responsibility with regard to a union ap-
plication for exclusive bargaining representative rights. According to
83. See Howe, Address to Industrial Law Society in London, Nov. 21, 1970 (on file
with author).
84. Ind. Rela. Act 1971, § 101.
85. Id. § 102.
86. Id. sched. 2, 9 25.
87. On Industrial Tribunals, see p. 1437 inIra.
88. A "designating order" permitting the parties to utilize their own machinery may
be granted and subsequently revoked if, in the opinion of the court, the agreement
no longer meets the statutory requirements. Ind. Rela. Act 1971, § 32.
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Section 45, an application may be made to the NIRO for reference
to the Commission on Industrial Relations on the following issues:
(1) whether a specified group of employees should be recognized or
continue to be recognized as a bargaining unit; and (2) whether a
"sole bargaining agent" or "joint negotiating panel" should be recog-
nized and if so, what organization should be the bargaining agent
or agents. s9
The Court also has jurisdiction over so-called emergency strikes
and has the authority to order the strike ballot in appropriate cir-
cumstances. 9o
The Commission on Industrial Relations (CIR), having been cre-
ated initially by Royal Warrant in 1969, is given a permanent statu-
tory base by the Act. The Commission has responsibility for the con-
duct of ballots in union security situations and in those involving
exclusive bargaining representative questions. In union security mat-
ters as well as representation questions, it may hold the elections it-
self or designate another party to do so.
The jurisdiction of Industrial Tribunals, originally the result of
previously enacted legislation, 1 is expanded by the Act. The Tri-
bunals are authorized to hear complaints against employers concern-
ing unfair dismissals or cases relating to the employees' right to join
or refrain from union membership. Like the NIRC, they are au-
thorized to fashion relief which is just and equitable.
Finally, the Industrial Court, created in 1919 to hear voluntary
arbitrations, will continue its previous function as the Industrial
Arbitration Board.
B. Registration
The system of registration is central to the statutory scheme. It
has no real analogue in American labor law.02 The Act creates a Chief
Registrar of Trade Unions and Employers Associations and orders
89. The NIRC is not to entertain an application for representation unless notice
of it is given to the Secretary of State (Minister of Employment and Productivity).
Ind. Rela. Act 1971, § 45, t 4.
90. Id. §§ 138-45.
91. Summarized id. § 100.
92. The only analogous provision among modem American statutes was the Taft-
Hartley Act, 1947, ch. 120, Title I, § 101, 61 Star. 146, adding § 9(h) to tile National
Labor Relations Act. This provision restricted investigation under NLRAL § 9(c), 29
U.S.C. 159(c), and access to complaint procedures under NLRA § 10(b), to unions whose
officers had filed non-Communist affidavits. This Section was, however, repealed in 1959
by the Landrum-Griffin Act, Pub. L. No. 86-257, § 201(d). Since then, tile only vaguely
similar restraint on US worker group activities has been the definition of a labor organiza-
tion, to which a workers' group must conform before it has access to tie Act's recogni-
tional machinery. NLRA § 2(5), 29 U.S.C. 152(5) (1970).
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him to register every organization which "immediately prior to the
passing of this Act" was registered as a trade union under the Trade
Unions Acts of 1871 to 1964. 93 The burden of de-registration is placed
upon unions: Given the almost total opposition of the labor move-
ment to the statute, it was thought that unions might not wish to
register, but would nonetheless hesitate to seek de-registration be-
cause of the serious consequences for organizations which are not
registered.9
4
The consequences of failing to register are enormous:"6 A worker
is not protected against discrimination for trade union membership
if the union is unregistered.00 An unregistered union may not utilize
the machinery through which a union may obtain recognition, agen-
cy shop or closed shop rights. 97 If an unregistered union violates a
collective bargaining agreement, induces individuals to break their
individual contract of employment, or engages in other activity con-
demned by the Act, the amount of damages that may be assessed
against it is unlimited."" Unregistered unions thus lose the immunity,
93. Ind. Rela. Act 1971, § 78.
94. Ind. Rela. Act 1971, § 92.
The position of the government was expressed by the Solicitor General (Sir Geoffrey
Howe): "Another effect is that non-registration which is clearly an important decision
for organization to take if it is already registered, would involve a conscious decision."
814 PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 257 (1971).
95. For summaries of the benefits of registration for unions, see I. lACItArxi, Tiie
TI.ms GUIDE TO THE INDUSTRIAL R LxrONs Aar 84.85 (1971); Elliott, Registration and
the TUC, Financial Times, Industrial Relations Conference, London, May 17, 1972.
96. Ind. Rela. Act 1971, §§ 61(3), 5(1), 5(2)(a).
97. Ind. Rela. Act 1971, §§ 61(3), 45(2), 11, 17.
The policy considerations behind barring unregistered organizations from the processes
referred to above emerge at 319 PARL. DEBn. H.L. (5th ser.) 327-30 (1971).
98. This results from a combination of the effects of the repeal of the Trades Dis.
putes Act of 1906, 6 Edw. 7, c.47 and of the Trade Disputes Act of 1965, c.48, schetd.
9, §§ 96-98, 117. In effect, the Trades Disputes Acts, particularly § 3 of the 1906 Act,
protected trade unions from liability for acts done in furtherance of trade disputes.
These sections were repealed by the Industrial Relations Act. Their protections were
replaced in part by §§ 96-98. But see § 132 as to tort actions. § 96 makes It an unfair
industrial practice for any non-registered group to induce breach of contract. Collective
bargaining agreements are excluded from the coverage of the term "contract" but
employment contracts are included. § 97(2) makes certain steps, such as calling or or-
ganizing a strike, in furtherance of an unfair industrial practice also an unfair indus.
trial practice. The limits on recovery in proceedings before the Industrial Court oil
complaints under the Act are only available to registered trade unions. Therefore,
the practical effect may often be that stated by Mrs. Castle during the Committee
stage of the bill in the House of Commons (albeit while discussing the Solicitor Gen.
eral's earlier acknowledgment that the principles of § 61 were expected to apply to
unregistered groups): "The simple fact is that, if an unregistered union goes on strike,
the protection of Section 3 of the 1906 Act is withdrawn. If an unregistered union
goes on strike, it faces in specific terms under the Bill unlimited financial damages
.... The Government themselves have to admit that it is almost impossible to have it
strike without a breach of contract of employment. What they are doing is taking
away something far more than just the protection of Section 3. The protection of
Section 3, which gave to unions the present traditional immunity for action in fur-
therance of a trade dispute, does not apply under this Bill to unregistered unions. If
such a union tries to operate such a strike, it faces actual unlimited damages." 811 p.ARt.,
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heretofore provided by the Trades Disputes Act of 1906, against tort
liability for inducing breaches of individual employment contracts
in a trade dispute.09 This is of enormous significance: Most individual
contracts require the worker to give proper notice to his employer
before terminating work, and most strikes, and certainly most unof-
ficial strikes (which arise spontaneously and often unpredictably),
violate these proper notice clauses.100 Moreover, unions which re-
fuse to register relinquish tax rebates available to the registered unions
with respect to interest on investments actually applied to the pay-
ment of non-strike or non-"industrial action" benefits (e.g., sickness
payments).' 0 ' It has been estimated that non-registration will impose
new tax liabilities of up to five million pounds a year on the unions.02°
For a trade union movement that is financially beleaguered, this is
no small matter.' 03 Further, while officials of registered unions act-
ing within the scope of their authority are protected against personal
liability, as are union officials in the United States, this is not the
case with non-registered unions.
10 4
DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 636 (1971). Though the Labour Part)' protested the Act's removal of
protection from unregistered unions, no complaint was made when the similar pro-
posal was made by the Donovan Commission, ROYAL Comt.. o.i TRADE UNIONS. R roT
supra note 65, at 215.
99. Under the 1971 Act the terminology is "industrial dispute" rather than "trade
dispute." The two terms are defined in much the same manner. However, under the
1971 statute certain secondary, "sympathetic" and closed shop stoppages are not in-
cluded. In the United States the reference is to a "labor dispute' under both the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1970) and the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 152(9) (1970).
See Local 33, Bakery Sales Drivers v. Wagshal, 333 U.S. 437 (1948); Columbia River
Packers Assn. v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143 (1942); New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocer
Co., 303 U.S. 552 (1938). Compare New Negro Alliance with Scala Ballroom (Wolver-
hampton) Ltd. v. Ratcliffe, [1958] 1 W.L.R. 1057 (C.A.).
100. For art excellent discussion of British case law on the legal significance of the
individual's failure to provide adequate notice in this context, see C. GRL'.FELD. MoDE N
TRADE UNION LAW 319-22 (1966); Morgan v. Fry (1958), 2 Q.B. 710. A majority of the
Donovan Commission took a position remarkably similar to the framers of the Indus-
trial Relations Act on protection for unions inducing such breaches in either official
or unofficial contexts, i.e., the requirement of registration. RoYAL Co.%.%. oN TRADE
UNIoNs, REPORT, supra note 65, at 235. However, the consequences of registration as
recommended by the Commission were not the same as those under the Act.
101. Registered organizations of workers ("trade unions" according to the language
of the Act) alone can recover income tax on funds applied to provident benefits, Income
and Corporation Taxes Act, 1970, c.10, § 338. One important question will be whether
unregistered groups may avoid this burden and obtain similar benefits by setting tp a
friendly society pursuant to the Friendly Societies Act, 1896, 59 & 60 Vict., c2,0 to deal
with provident funds. See also 322 PAns.. Dan. H.L. (5th ser.) 58-74 (1971). See also
Routledge, Engineering Union Votes to Safeguard Funds, The Times (London) Nov. 10,
1971, at 19, col. 1.
102. See Torode, Unions Could Avoid Tax Under Act, The Guardian, Aug. 12,
1971, at 7, col. 7.
103. See Harper, TUC Challenges 'Concession' in Industrial Act, The Guardian,
Aug. 23, 1971, at 5, col. 4; Harper, Brothers in a Cash Crisis, The Guardian, Aug. 3,
1971, at 11, col. 1.
104. Ind. Rela. Act 1971, § 96(1)(b).
That personal liability for eytra-official actions (though not in tort) is contemplated
was made apparent during the Second Reading debates in the House of Commons. 803
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The Registrar has the authority to examine rules of the organiza-
tion and, if they are not in accord with basic principles of the Act,
the organization must revise them. If this is not done, the Registrar
is to apply to the NIRC for registration to be cancelled. Although un-
registered unions do not submit their rules to the scrutiny of the
Registrar, the principles that the Registrar devises with regard to
union rules are generally applicable to unregistered unions in legal
proceedings before the Industrial Court, as well as to those which
are registered. 105
A complaint alleging unfair industrial practices or breaches of an
organization's rules may be lodged with the Registrar. If he finds
merit in the complaint, the Registrar may attempt to bring about a
settlement. If no settlement is reached, the Registrar may present
the case to the NIRC. (Challenges to the rules and internal prac-
tices are taken by an Industrial Tribunal where the union is unregis-
tered.)
A significant purpose of the registration system is to determine
who has responsibility for violations of collective agreements and for
fulfilling various statutory obligations. The TUC and most of
Britain's major unions have declared unequivocal opposition to sub-
mitting to registration. 10 6 Unregistered unions will also have ample
incentive under the Act to revise their internal procedures and to
regulate the times and manner in which shop stewards and other
officials call stoppages: Strikes by an unregistered union will usually
constitute a breach of the individual employment contracts of its
members, and the union, no longer protected by the Trades Disputes
Act of 1906,107 will be subject to unlimited damages for inducement
of this breach. 08 In case of registration, the Registrar facilitates in-
ternal reorganization of the union by requiring that officials responsi-
ble for industrial action be identified.
09
PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 981-82 (1970). See also 811 PARL. DED. H.C. (5th ser.) 1705.09.
As to protection from personal liability in the United States, see LMRA § 301(b), 29
U.S.C. § 185(b) (1970), and Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962). Sc
also Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Union, 447 F.2d 945
(7th Cir. 1971). Whether individuals are subject to injunctions its American labor law
remains a troubled question.
105. That this is the intended effect of § 61 was made apparent during the House
of Commons committee stage. 814 PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 274 (1971).
106. See note 51 supra.
107. 6 Edw. 7, c.47. The landmark case holding that there is tort liability for In.
ducing breach of the contract of employment is Lumley v. Guy, [1853] 2 El. § 111. 216,
118 Eng. Rep. 749.
108. See pp. 1462-63 infra.
109. Ind. Rela. Act 1971, sched. 4, 10. This identification provision is central to
the Act's purposes. The Act requires unions to prevent and halt, through reasonably
practicable steps, all actions contrary to the terms of an enforceable collective bargaining
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C. Policies
The "general principles" of the Industrial Relations Act of 1971
are set forth in Part I of the statute. 10 The first principle supports
the practice of collective bargaining "freely conducted on behalf of
workers and employers and with due regard to the general interest
of the community. . . ." The second, once again stated in the context
of the general interest of the community, supports the "developing
and maintaining of orderly procedures in industry for peaceful and
expeditious settlement of disputes by negotiation, conciliation or
arbitration." Third, the statute endorses the principle of "free as-
sociation" of workers in "independent trade unions" and provides the
same right to employers' associations. Finally, the Act states that the
principle of "freedom and security" for workers is to be protected
by the safeguards against unfair industrial practices whether engaged
in by employers or unions.
In the United States, the National Labor Relations Act enunciates
certain "policies" which are devised in light of "findings" set forth
in § 1.111 While both statutes pay specific heed to the self-organiza-
tion rights of workers, as well as to the desirability of collective bar-
gaining, the British statute makes specific reference to a "general in-
terest of the community" which can presumably conflict with the ob-
jectives of both unions and employers. Moreover, the American stat-
ute, in its findings, contains statements which the British Parliament
would have been reluctant to make in 1971. The central one is that
an "inequality" of bargaining power between unions and employers,
to the advantage of employers, is a cause of industrial strife. It is this
factor which necessitated the right of self-organization, the promotion
of collective bargaining and the encouragement to devise peaceful
procedures to resolve differences in the United States. It is not at all
clear that the same finding could have been made with regard to Brit-
agreement. Id. § 36(2). Individuals are liable for breach of this duty unless they are
acting within the scope of union authority. Id. § 96. The identification provision is
important in determining which individuals enjoy union authorization. If an individual
acts under union authority, his breach of § 36(2) duties is imputed to the union as
commission of an unfair industrial practice by the union.
110. Ind. Rela. Act 1971. § 1. The principles of § I are to guide the Secretary of
State in preparing a draft Code of Practice. Id. § 2(1).
111. 29 U.S.C. § 51 (1970). The Act aims to eliminate the causes of certain "sub-
stantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce" by encouraging the "practice and
procedure of collective bargaining" and by protecting the exercise by workers of self-
organization rights and rights to designate representatives to negotiate the terms and
conditions of employment or to provide other "mutual aid and protection.' In particular
29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1970) specifically promotes "final adjustment by a method agreed
upon by the parties" as the best way to achieve a settlement of grievance disputes in-
volving interpretation or application of the existing collective agreement.
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ish unions. If inequality of bargaining power exists in Britain, the
employer is arguably as likely as the union to be the weaker party.112
Certainly that was the view of the Parliament which enacted the In-
dustrial Relations Act of 1971.
D. Code of Practice
The purpose of the Code, 13 adopted by parliamentary resolution,
is to provide practical guidance for the promotion of good relation-
ships between unions and employers. It is an attempt to define the
proper behavior of unions and employers in collective bargaining as
well as to clarify the meaning of new statutory concepts, e.g., the ap-
propriate unit. While it binds no one and is without the force of law,
the Code is to be "taken into account" by both the National Indus-
trial Relations Court and Industrial Tribunals. Presumably, a viola-
tion of recommendations contained in the Code would be relevant
in determining a remedy under the Act's "just and equitable" pro.
visions. In a system where litigation has rarely been used to date, the
effect of the Code upon the parties may be substantial. It may well
be that, like the detailed collective agreement in the United States,
the Code will soon become a critical element in the collective rela-
tionship. This could occur regardless of the Act's impact or failure
in other respects.
III. An Analysis of the Act
A. Recognition and the Establishment of Collective Bargaining
The 1971 Act represents Parliament's first attempt to outlaw anti-
union discrimination by employers and thus to shield the right to
organize from employer pressures. The Act establishes procedures
under which employers may be obligated to bargain with unions
and under which recognition rights as a sole bargaining agent may
be granted and withdrawn. After the Industrial Court promulgates
an order obligating an employer to recognize the union as a sole
bargaining agent, it is an unfair industrial practice for the employer
to carry on bargaining in that unit with any other organization of
workers. 114 Moreover, it is an unfair practice for a union to engage
112. Cf. 0. KAHN-FREUND, LABOR LAW: OLD TRADITIONS AND NEW DEVELOPMENTS (1968).
113. DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT, THE CENTRAL OFFICE OF INFORMATION, INDUSTRIAL
RELATION CODE OF PRACTICE (1972) [hereinafter cited as CODE OF PRACTICE].
114. Ind. Rela. Act 1971, § 55(1)(a).
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in a strike aimed at compelling negotiations with another union, or
for an employer to engage in a lock-out which is an attempt to induce
a party to withdraw an application for recognition under the Act.Ia5
The Act requires employers to bargain collectively with unions where
they have been properly recognized (although no corresponding duty
is imposed on unions),11 and employers must disclose to unions in-
formation which is necessary for the "carrying on [of] collective bar-
gaining" and information the disclosure of which is "in accordance
with good industrial relations practice.""--
The Act in Section 5 authorizes every worker to join a trade union
"as he may choose" and, subject to the statute's union security pro-
visions, to be a member of no union or "other organization of work-
ers. ' " s The statute makes it an unfair industrial practice for an em-
ployer to "prevent or deter" the exercise of these rights or to "dis-
miss, penalize, or othenvise discriminate" [against] a worker for the
exercise of these rights.70 As in the United States, the closed shop is
prohibited in most circumstances, 20  although the agency shop, in
115. Id. §§ 55(3), (7), and (8). Even if there is no Court order subsequent to a ballot,
but rather a CIR report to the Court, industrial action by unions and employers is
precluded to the same extent.
116. Ind. Rela. Act 1971, § 55(l)(b).
117. A general duty to disclose, applicable only to registered trade unions (see 319 P,%l..
DB. H.L. (5th ser.) 415-22 (1971), is imposed by § 56. Under § 158, however, certain
information need not be disclosed if it would be "against the interests of national se-
curity," "seriously prejudicial to the interests of the employer's undertaking for reasons
other than its effect on collective bargaining," etc. In addition § 57 provides that a
company employing more than 350 non-excepted persons must issue a )early financial
statement to its employees (an obligation which is subject to such exemptions as are
allowed under regulations issued by the Secretary of State).
It should be noted that this obligation on the part of employers was introduced by
the government. See 808 PARL. DEn. H.C. (5th ser.) 975-76 (1970). Some attempts to in-
crease the burden were made in the House of Lords. See 319 PARL. DEn. H.L. (5th ser.)
402-31 (1971); 321 PARL. DEaB. H.L. (5th ser.) 1058-80 (1971); 322 PAR_ DEn. H.L. (5th
ser.) 899-902 (1971). However, relatively little commotion arose over the imposition of
this obligation. By contrast, fierce battles have been waged in the United States both
before and after the obligation was imposed by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Truitt
Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956), upholding an NLRB decision that an emplo)er breached
its obligation to bargain in good faith by not disclosing information to support its
claimed inability to pay increased wages.
118. Ind. Rela. Act 1971, § 5(1)(a) and (b). Tie union security provisions specifically
referred to in this section are found in § 6 (the agency shop) and § 17 (the approved
closed shop). The government's policy motivations in conferring a right not to join
a union may be found at 810 PAaR. DEn. H.C. (5th ser.) 667.68, 671-73 (1971).
119. Ind. Rela. Act 1971, § 5(2)(a) and (b).
120. Approved post-entry closed shop agreements are allowed under § 17 of the
Act. However, a worker with a conscientious objection to joining a trade union can be"specially exempted," in which case he must make "appropriate contributions" to
charity. The procedures for obtaining such an exemption and for detenining tie
amount of such contribution are set out in Part IV of Schedule I of the Act. Provision
is made therein for reference to an Industrial Tribunal of disputes concerning genuine.
ness of a worker's objection to membership. See 813 PARL. DEn. H.C. (5th ser.) 850.84
(general threat to certain unions, particularly entertainment, if dosed shops were not
allowed), 689-96 (threat to seafaring unions) (1971).
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which the equivalent of union dues and initiation fees must be paid
by the worker, is permitted.1
2 '
Difficult problems of legal theory and practice are raised by this
injection of statutory rules into the heretofore informal procedures
by which unions won the membership of workers and the recogni-
tion of employers. Here three of the major problems are considered:
How, if at all, will the formal rules and traditional TUC procedures
co-exist? Does the statutory language sufficiently protect an em-
ployee's right to join, to refrain from joining, or to resign from a
union? Is the machinery whereby unions gain recognition for bar-
gaining realistic and workable?
1. Bridlington and Croydon: Internal TUG Procedures.
In establishing legal recognition machinery, and in creating the
right to join and resign from unions, the Act is in potential conflict
with the Trades Union Congress Bridlington Principles and Proce-
dures122 and with the 1969 Croydon Congress, 23 under which the TUG
has authority to settle both membership disputes and differences about
which unions should be recognized. To the extent that the TUG
designates a particular union as representative, and insofar as this re-
quires other unions to discourage their members from recruiting and
to desist from further organizational efforts, Bridlington and Croy-
don both interfere with employee free choice as prescribed by the Act.
Apparently, however, the statute's provisions concerning recognition
and right to join and resign will be interpreted with due deference
to the established TUC practice. The Code of Industrial Relations
Practice, which controls interpretation of the statute's guiding princi-
ples in cases arising under the Act, states that "responsibility for avoid-
ing disputes between trade unions about recognition lies principally
with the unions themselves and, in the case of affiliated unions, with
the Trades Union Congress," and unions are to make full use of the
available procedures . 2 4 Evident here is one of the main themes of the
Act, i.e., the encouragement of voluntary machinery or efforts to re-
121. Ind. Rela. Act 1971, § 5(1)(b), § 6.
122. On major disputes, the TUG Disputes Committee adjudicates, with the only
sanction being disaffiliation. 1. MACBEATi, THE TIMES GUIDE TO TiE INDUSrIThAL RELA-
TIONS Acr 102 (1971).
123. Croydon simply applies the principles of Bridlington, under which recognltlonil
disputes are heard by TUC, to jurisdictional stoppages. Croydon was the product of
the 1969 Labour Party-TUG accord. See Wood, Anti.Strike Bil Abandoned by Wilson:
Agreement Heals Breach in the Labour Movement, The Times (London) June 19, 1969,
at 1, col. 1.
124. CODE OF PRAcTIcE, supra note 113, at 85.
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solve disputes. The Code refers to "recognition" disputes, which are
the subject of Bridlington, and not to "membership" or jurisdictional
disputes, which are the subject of Croydon. Presumably, however,
since it is often difficult to differentiate between the two in a given
situation,125 TUC procedures will be of relevance in interpreting the
Act in both contexts. The Act further buttresses the position taken
in the Code by precluding unions from denying application for mem-
bership only if the denial is arbitrary. 2" Thus, though an employee
has a statutory right to resign from a union to which he has been as-
signed by TUC procedures, 127 he does not have an absolute right to
join another union, and the Bridlington procedures will apparently
be taken into consideration by authorities weighing whether a par-
ticular union's refusal to admit a new member is arbitrary within the
meaning of the Act. -128
2. Restraining Employer and Union Pressure on Employee Rights
Developing in the courts, case by case, the American law on em-
ployer discrimination against union activity has acquired a certain
flexibility. In attempting to accomplish this task with a single, though
concededly detailed, statute, the British may have missed important
subtleties. For example, Section 5(4) of the Industrial Relations Act
states that where an employer offers a benefit of "any kind" to a
worker as an inducement to refrain from the exercise of Section 5
rights, the employer violates the Act if the employer has (a) con-
ferred the benefit on workers who agree to refrain from exercising
Section 5 rights and (b) withheld the benefit from one or more who
did not agree to refrain. The narrow, technical terms, in which these
criteria are framed may defeat achievement of a praiseworthy objec-
tive. In the United States the Board and the Supreme Court have
prohibited more broadly the promising and granting of benefits dur-
ing organizational campaigns. In a leading case, 2 9 Mr. Justice Har-
125. See Carey v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (196).
126. Ind. Rela. Act 1971, §§ 65(1), (2). Enforcement is via unfair industrial practice
sanction under § 66.
127. Resignation is specifically allowed under § 65(3).
128. That this was the thinking of the government emerges fron the lengthy debate
at 319 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) 610-25 (1971). For some of the problems in American
labor law, see Atleson, Union Fines and Picket Lines: The ,'LRA and Union Discipli.
nary Power, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 681 (1970); Gould, Sonic Limitations Upon Union
Discipline: The Radiation of Allis Chalmers, 1970 D.'KE L.J. 1067. See NLRII v.
Local 1029, Textile Workers, 446 F.2d 369 (lst Cir. 1971). cert. granted, 403 US. 937
(1972); Boeing Co., 185 N.L.R.B. No. 23 (1970) modificd, 459 F.2d 1143 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
General Gravure Co., 186 N.L.R.B. No. 69 (1970).
129. NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405 (1964).
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lan stated that the granting of such benefits during organizational
campaigns could be regarded by the Board as an unlawful and im-
proper interference with the rights of self-organization. The Court's
reasoning was that employees will recognize that an employer which
has the authority to grant such benefits can also take them away.
Fearing a "get tough" policy by the employer after the campaign,
if the union should win, employees might be deterred from showing
an interest in union organizational activity. Of course this theory is
not without difficulties. As commentators have pointed out,130 em-
ployees could use the benefits as a floor for future bargaining once
the union representative is on the scene. Alternatively, the employees
might not have had any interest in the union to begin with and might
be using the representation petition simply to extract the benefits
granted. Nevertheless, a law dealing with employer campaign strate-
gies should be broad and flexible enough to cover a wide variety of
coercive employer techniques. The Act is surely too rigid in assuming
that employers are so unsophisticated as to confer benefits for re-
fusal to exercise rights and simultaneously withhold them from those
engaged in union activity.
Rigidity may also plague Section 5(l)(c), which states that employees
have the right as trade union members to participate politically "at an
appropriate time." Section 5(5) defines an appropriate time as one
"outside" working hours or as a "time within his [the employee's]
working hours at which, in accordance with the arrangements agreed
with, or consent given by or on behalf of his employer, it is permis-
sible for him to take part in those activities." Conceivably, the lan-
guage of Section 5 may mean that union organizational activity and
political participation in union matters may never take place on com-
pany property, and never during working time, absent management
consent.131 One may hope, however, that the meaning is otherwise,
because such a blanket prohibition would surely be draconian.
In an apparent divergence from American law,132 the Industrial
Relations Act, in Section 5(3), specifically permits an employer to "en-
courage" workers to become union members subsequent to the time
that the union has achieved recognition and bargaining status. Ac-
cordingly, it might be said that Section 5 is less neutral, and more
130. See Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under
the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 112 (1964).
131. Debates on two amendments dealing with the section suggest that the govern-
ment's purpose was to moderately expand workers' inplant union rights somewhat, without
in any way limiting extant rights. See 318 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser) 301-12 (1971).
132. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970).
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solicitous of the right to join, than is the case in the United States.
For two reasons, however, this conclusion would be erroneous. First,
the American statute, while neutral in the sense of protecting the
right to refrain, nevertheless has as a basic policy the promotion of
free collective bargaining. Second, employer encouragement of union
activity has its obvious analogue in the National Labor Relations Act's
legitimization of check-off provisions 33 and of employer arrange-
ments for unions to meet on company property and for union offi-
cials to use company facilities.13 4 Further, unlike the British Act,
Taft-Hartley specifically provides employers with a right of free
speech, 35 which effectively permits management to express a view in
favor of unionization. Finally, like the NLRA, which opposes com-
pany dominated or assisted unions,1 30 the Act provides that Section 5
rights, and the statute's support of the principles of collective bar-
gaining, pertain only to "independent" trade unions.' Thus, despite
superficial appearances, the statutes adopt similar policy toward em-
ployer encouragement of union activity.
Unlike the NLRA, 138 the British Act does not specifically prohibit
unions from interferring with an individual's right to refrain from
joining a union. Unions are, however, effectively barred from pres-
suring employers to discriminate against non-members, for Section 5
prohibits employer discrimination against an employee who refrains
from membership, and an employer charged with a statutory violation
may claim that a third party, i.e., the union, is primarily or jointly
liable, and damages may, as in the United States, be assessed against
the union.13 9
133. LMRA § 302, 29 U.S.C. § 462 (1970).
134. NLRA § 8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1970).
135. NLRA § 8(c), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1970).
136. NLRA § 8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1970).
137. Section 5 rights exist in a registered union only if it "is an independent or-
ganization of workers," §67(1)(a). Under the interpretation provision § 167, except as
the context otherwise requires, "independent," in relation to a trade union or other
organization, means "not under the domination or control of an employer or of a
group of employers or of one or more organizations of employers."
Similarly, labor applications to the Industrial Court for recognition as a sole bar-
gaining agent under § 45 may be made only by "trade unions," a ten of art which,
according to § 61, covers only those organizations of workers which are registered. See
813 PARL. DFn. H.C. (5th ser.) 1541-86 (1971) and 321 PA.L. DEn. H.L. (5th ser.) 93212
(1971). Regarding the issue of independence, it has been alleged that unions are being
permitted to register although only a small percentage of their activities are devoted
to bargaining, and with no inquiry into the "union's" financial viability rules or ac-
counts. But see Acid Test of Registration, The Times (London), Sept. 12, 1972, at 17,
col. 1, which indicates that the Registrar is now removing a number of "staff associations"
from the register.
138. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(b)(1)(A), (2) (1970).
139. Ind. Rela. Act 1971, § 5(2). For American labor law on joint liability, see NLRA
§ 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970). See also Acme Mattress Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 1010 (1950).
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Section 65 prohibits unions from excluding individuals from mem-
bership unreasonably or arbitrarily,140 and from imposing unreason-
able or unfair disciplinary action.' 4 ' A union must give reasonable
notice to terminate a member.14 2 As in the United States, however,
the scope of an individual's right to resign from a union is somewhat
clouded. Developing American case law indicates that employees gen-
erally have the right to renounce union membership at the time that
they resign,14 3 but it appears that unions may qualify this right in
their constitutions or by-laws. 44 In Britain, under the Act, an em-
ployee may resign his membership by giving reasonable notice and
complying with reasonable conditions. 145 Since this provision reads
in the conjunctive, union rules may apparently impose additional
rules for retirement than the mere giving of reasonable notice.
Generally, the Act's Section 65, and its registration provisions, indi-
cate that statutory agencies in Britain will be much concerned with
internal union affairs. In the United States, by contrast, Section 8(b)-
(1) (A) creates a presumption against interference in internal union
affairs. 146
140. See note 126 supra. It should also be noted that unsuccessful attempts were
made to enlarge reasonableness to include exclusion of members who previously re.
signed pursuant to the exercise of § 5 rights, 319 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) 633.40 (197),
and to include exclusion of publicly anti-union individuals, 319 I'ARL. DEn, H.L. (5th
ser.) 641-48 (1971).
141. The Labour Party voiced no opposition to the principle of limiting unfair or
unreasonable disciplinary action by unions. An amendment to delete § 65(7) (the section
that prohibits unfair or unreasonable disciplinary action) was introduced in the pro.
fessed hope of getting clarification of the Registrar's probable view of rules possibly ht.
consistent with § 65(7) when exercising his responsibility to review the rules of trade
unions as to their consistency with the Act. See 319 PAtL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) 674.75
(1971).
In addition, an unsuccessful attempt was made to give unions the power to discipline
employees for non-participation in industrial action without violating the provision of
subsec. 7, 319 PARL. Da. H.L. (5th ser.) 675-86 (1971).
142. Ind. Rela. Act 1971, § 65(9).
143. Cf. Gould, Some Limitations Upon Discipline Under the National Labor Rela-
lions Act: the Radiations of Allis Chalmers, 1970 DuKE L.J. 1067, 1096.1107 (1970) and
cases cited therein.
144. Id. However, even in the absence of constitutional limitations, one court has
held-in a case now before the Supreme Court-that union members may temnporarily
waive their resignation rights by voting to strike. NLRB v. Local 1029, Textile Workers,
446 F.2d 369 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 405 U.S. 987 (1972).
145. The government's motive for including this right was apparently to make
explicit a right implicit in the larger right not to be a union member. That this right
is to be exercisable only within reasonable limits is apparent from the Lord Chancellor's
reply to an amendment (which was defeated) to delete § 65(3), the resignation section.
319 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) 649-50 (1971); 321 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) 1155-58 (1971).
(Debate on requiring payment of dues before union membership could be terminated
where the government representative, Lord Belstead, again voiced the expectation that
any reasonable restrictions in union rules would be acceptable but contended it would
be inappropriate to spell out what rules would be reasonable in the Act).
146. 29 U.S.C. § 158b(1)(A) (1970). Of course, the Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959, 29
U.S.C. §§ 153, 158-0 et seq. (1970) cuts quite deeply into internal union rules, See
Summers, American Legislation for Union Democracy, 25 MODERN L. REv. 278 (1962).
1448
Taft-Hartley Comes to Great Britain
3. The Recognition Machineiy
Under the National Labor Relations Act labor organizations, em-
ployers, employees or groups of employees may file representation
petitions with the Board.147 If the Board finds that there is a ques-
tion of representation, it may hold a hearing on this and other issues.
The Board has the obligation to determine the appropriate unit with-
in which the election shall take place and, assuming that a majority
of employees designate a union representative, within which bar-
gaining shall take place. 148 The Board has devised numerous criteria
for the purpose of determining which unit is appropriate. Employees
who have a "community of interest" with one another are generally
regarded as part of one appropriate unit.1 4 9 In making this deter-
mination the Board looks to whether employees work geographically
proximate to one another, are under the same common supervision,
interchange positions with one another, have similar wages, hours
and fringe benefits and other employment conditions. The employer's
administrative structure is also studied, to determine whether the
employees are on the same payroll or under the same accounting sys-
temY. 0 The Board may not lump professionals with non-professionals
in one unit,151 unless the professionals vote for inclusion in such a
unit, nor may the Board determine that a craft unit is inappropriate
simply because a different unit was previously established by the
Board. 2 And the Board may not include building guards in a unit
which contains other employees. 153 Once a valid election has been
held, no election is to be held within the next twelve months.164 If a
union wins the election and is certified, the employer cannot chal-
lenge the union's majority status during the first certification year
absent unusual circumstances. Even subsequent to the first certifica-
Compare the discussion in 0. KAHN-FREUND, LABoUR AND rTE LW 210-22 (1972). More-
over, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits denial of union membership on grounds of
race, color, sex, nationality or religion. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(2) (1970).
147. NLRA § 9(c), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1970).
148. NLRA § 9(b), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1970).
149. Continental Baking Co., 99 N.L.R.B. No. 123 (1952) and cases cited therein. See
generally Tie DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 217-22 (C. Morris ed. 1971). In order to en-
courage plant bargaining, the Industrial Relations Act of 1971 indicates that an ap-
propriate unit will not normally consist of a national bargaining arrangement. Such
arrangements are referred to as "more extensive bargaining arrangements" and are
distinguished from a "bargaining unit." Id. § 44.
150. However, employer administrative structures alone do not determine the ap-
propriate unit. Cf. Swift & Co., 101 N.L.R.B. No. 2 (1952).
151. NLRA § 9(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(1) (1970). See also Leedom v. g)ne, 358
Us. 184 (1958).
152. NLRA § 9(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(2) (1970).
153. NLRA § 9(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(3) (1970).
154. NLRA § 9(c)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1970).
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tion year, a negotiated collective bargaining agreement operates as a
bar for up to three years against an intervening representation peti-
tion, and an employer challenging a union's majority status must
overcome a presumption that the union retains that status.155
In Britain the machinery is more complicated, in large measure
because an attempt has been made to encourage the parties to rely
upon their own devices.
Applications for recognition and sole bargaining agent status may
be made to the NIRC by trade unions and employers which are
registered under the Act, and by the Secretary of State as well. 150 The
Court is not to entertain an application under Section 45 unless notice
has been given to the Secretary of State and the Secretary has first
provided advice and assistance to the parties giving the notice that
the Secretary believes to be appropriate. 1 7 This provision aims to
promote agreement between the parties concerning matters referred
to in the application. While the NLRA also encourages voluntary
settlement, once a petition is filed with the Board, negotiations look
toward a consent election through which employee free choice will
manifest itself at the ballot box. This is clearly not the case with the
Industrial Relations Act. Even if settlement is not achieved, a recom-
mendation of the Commission on Industrial Relations on recognition
can be accepted by the parties without further proceedings before the
Court-proceedings which would lead to a ballot and order.1 58 If the
155. The bar on representation petitions is referred to as the "contract bar" rule.
Its term was extended to 3 years in 1962 by the Board in General Cable Corp., 139
N.L.R.B. 1123 (1962).
The continuing majority status presumption was recently reiterated by the Board
in Terrell Machine Co., 173 N.L.R.B. 1480 (1969), citing Celanese Corporation of
America, 95 N.L.R.B. 664, 671-72 (1951).
156. Ind. Rela. Act (1971), § 45. Clause 3 of section 45 requires the Secretary of
State, before making an application with respect to a group of employees, to consult
the employer(s) and "any organization of workers or joint negotiating panel appearing
to him to be directly concerned in the matters to which the proposed application would
relate." One of the reasons for such consultation is that the parties in respect of whom
he was making the application "should not . .. be taken by a reference to the court
in that way." 813 PAR.L. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 1546 (1971). Thus, a non-registered trade
union could be consulted; for that matter, a company union could be consulted,
157. Subsection 4 of § 45 was originally introduced and accepted as an amendment
to the replaced el. 42, and was included in the later introduced section, See 811 I'ARL,
DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 427-28 (1971), and 813 PARra. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 1547-50 (1971).
158. The Act is structured so that, even though the Commission has recommended
that a particular organization of workers or joint negotiating panel should be rccog.
nized as sole bargaining agent for a bargaining unit, application must be made to
the Industrial Court for an order making the recommendation binding. Ind. Rela, Act
1971, &§ 49, 50. Only after such an application has been made is a ballot taken to
ascertain employee sentiment (sentiment, that is, on the question of whether the Coin.
mission's recommendation should be made binding). Id. § 49(3). Thus, employee
sentiment is not canvassed via ballot until the very last stage of the recognition pro.
cedure, prior to which time the question of who will represent employees can be set-
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Court is satisfied that the parties have endeavored to settle the issues
concerning the scope of the bargaining unit as well as the identity
of the bargaining agent, the Court may refer the questions to the
Commission so that a "lasting settlement" may be promoted. Here
the Court must not only examine the extent to which the parties have
exerted themselves, but also satisfy itself that the parties have made
adequate use of conciliation facilities made available by the Depart-
ment of Employment. If settlement cannot be achieved, the Commis-
sion is to report to the Court on the outstanding issues.
In determining the appropriate bargaining unit, the Commission
is specifically directed to consider the "nature of the work" per-
formed by the employees as well as their "training, experience and
professional and other qualifications."'" 0 (The Code of Practice pro-
vides more detailed criteria.) 0 Since the unit may not extend to
employees other than those "of an employer or two or more as-
tied by employer-union agreement. The chances for mistake via this procedure are
minimized, however, by the admonition to the Commission in § 48(4) that:
A report of the Commission under this section shall not recommend the recogni-
tion of an organization of workers or joint negotiating panel as sole bargaining
agent for a bargaining unit unless it appears to the Commission ....
(b) that its recognition as sole bargaining agent for that bargaining unit would
be in accordance with the general wishes of the employees comprised in that bar-
gaining unit, and would promote a satisfactory and lasting settlement of the ques.
tion in issue in the reference.
Should mistakes occur, there is the potential for rectification via decertification of the
sole bargaining agent. Id. at 51-53.
159. Ind. Rela. Act 1971, § 48(3). The inclusion of the word "professional" in the
list of considerations resulted from a desire by both the Labour and Conservative Parties
to protect the interests of true professionals. Though finally included as the result
of a government proposed amendment in the House of Lords, the same amendment
was offered earlier by the opposition, 319 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th cer.) 343-48 (1971). The
earlier amendment was withdrawn pending government consideration of the best way
to define professional so that every skilled group could not make a claim of professional-
ism. Unable to do that adequately without being over-inclusive or, worse, leaving out
some clearly recognizable professionals, the government stayed with the single word
description "professional," leaving further refinement to the Commission on Industrial
Relations, 321 PAL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) 346.47 (1971). Debate on the initial amend-
ment offered by the opposition centered mostly on the problem of imposing dual
loyalties on professionals, i.e., to professional standards and associations and to unions.
Both Labour and the Conservatives, however, seemed favorably disposed to the distinction
between professional and non-professionals. However, the Opposition in the Hous of
Commons was more recalcitrant. Their hesitancy stemmed from fears that such a
distinction would impede the progress of middle-class and professional organization by
unions. The government countered by arguing that professionals must be free to de-
velop their own organizations for representation and that man), professionals fear
being swallowed up, and having their interests ignored, by non-professional unions. In fact,
this rationale for the distinction strongly suggests that the term was included not be-
cause of limited concerns about possible conflicts of interest, but rather because of a
broader fear of inadequate representation. 822 PARL. Drn. H.C. (5th ser.) 1621-34 (1971).
It should be noted that professional organizations can be entered on a special
register under §§ 84-86, giving them a standing similar to that of a registered trade
union.
160. CoDE oF PRAcricE, supra note 113, C, 74-81.
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sociated employers," industry-wide bargaining units are ruled out.
The provision comports with the Donovan Commission's promotion
of company and plant agreements, but the Act does not intend to
eliminate industry-wide or company bargaining on matters not cov.
ered by plant bargaining. The Commission may recommend recogni-
tion of an organization of workers if it appears to the Commission
that the organization is "independent" and that its recognition would
be in "accordance with the general wishes of the employees com-
prised in that bargaining unit." The Commission, in this connection,
is also to consider whether recognition would provide a "satisfactory
and lasting settlement" of the issues involved. More particularly, the
Commission is to determine whether the organization in question
possesses the support of a "substantial proportion" of the employees
in the appropriate unit and whether the organization has the re-
sources requisite to effective representation of the employees in ques-
tion. Presumably, the Commission will conduct the same kind of
soundings undertaken by that agency before the Act's existence. While
an unregistered union may not apply for recognition under Section
45, the CIR may recommend that such a union should be the sole
bargaining agent. Moreover, an unregistered union may achieve sole
bargaining status through voluntary agreements with the employer. 101
In neither instance, however, may such a relationship be protected
by an NIRC order.
Subsequent to the Commission's recommendations, the employer
or the union may make an application to the Court and, if the Court
is satisfied that the recommendations of the Commission were uncon-
ditional or that any conditions have been "sufficiently complied
with," the Court is to request the Commission to establish a ballot
of the employees in the unit to determine whether the recommenda-
tions of the Commission should be binding. The Commission or some
other "body" may conduct the ballot but it must be kept "secret."
If a "majority of the employees voting on the ballot are in favor" of
making the Commission recommendation a binding one, the Court
is to issue an order defining both the bargaining unit and the parties
who are obligated to bargain. In Great Britain, one bargaining agent
or joint panel recommended by the Commission is to be considered
by the workers in an Industrial Court-ordered election, rather than
any number of unions being on the ballot as in an NLRB-ordered
election.
161. See 319 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) 353-55 (1971).
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Where there is no order by the Court-and this includes unregis-
tered union relationships-a decertification petition or application
may be entertained by the Court if it is "satisfied that not less than
one-fifth of the employees for the time being comprised in the bar-
gaining unit have signified in writing their concurrence in the ap-
plication." 162 This may be done at any time. Accordingly, where set-
tlement has been achieved or where no ballot has been applied for
subsequent to a Commission recommendation, the relationship be-
tween union and employer is relatively unsheltered. Where there is
an order by the Court in effect, such an application cannot be heard
if it is filed within two years of the time that the initial recognition
order was issued by the Court. Moreover, where there is an order
by the Court the requisite number of employees supporting the peti-
tion is two-fifths rather than one-fifth. In the United States, of course,
there are no such distinctions. In all cases a petition can be triggered
by thirty per cent of the workers in an appropriate unit-the same
number requisite to the filing of a representation petition.
103
Finally, where an application with the Court has been filed pur-
suant to Section 45, and where questions have been referred to the
Commission or are to be referred, neither the employer nor union
may engage in lockouts, strikes or "irregular industrial action" or
threaten to do so concerning the issues in dispute, while the matter
is pending. 64 Further, where the Court has issued an order, it is
an unfair industrial practice for the employer to bargain with an
organization other than that referred to in the order or to refuse to
bargain collectively with the appropriate party. Similarly, it is an un-
fair industrial practice for any party to engage in or threaten a strike
or other irregular industrial action which would induce or attempt
to induce the employer to engage in the above-mentioned violations.
Accordingly, if a party moves quickly to utilize the Act's recognition
162. Ind. Rela. Act 1971, § 51(2).
163. The thirty per cent requirement for decertification petitions is contained in
the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 195(c) (1970). However, the thirty per
cent requirement for the filing of a representation petition is an administrative regula-
tion of the NLRB, promulgated pursuant to the Board's investigatory power under
§ 159. The regulation reflects the Board's administrative experience that in the absence
of special factors the conduct of an election serves no purpose under the statute unless
the petitioner has been designated by at least thirty per cent of the emplo)ecs. 29
C.F.R. § 101.18 (1972).
164. See note 115 supra. Such activities are declared to be unfair industrial practices
by § 54 of the Act. The purpose of the section is relatively clear on its face. The section
does contain two rather wooly definitions of what questions qualify to create the
potential for an unfair industrial practice and of when such questions are pending. See
319 PaRL. DFB. H.L. (5th ser.) 397-400 (1971).
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machinery under appropriate circumstances, 0 5 economic pressure
that would otherwise be lawful becomes unlawful. However, although
there is no American-type requirement that the union have made
a demand for recognition as a prerequisite to the issuance of an in-
junction,166 the Industrial Relations Court has already held that a
recognition dispute must exist for an unfair industrial practice to be
made out.
67
The most glaring problem with the British recognition machinery
is its apparent inability to function expeditiously. Section 45 sets into
motion a very lengthy and complicated procedure. The involvement
of two separate agencies would appear to compound such difficulties.
The American experience is that speed is of special importance in
the representation arena. Procedures have been devised to make the
Board's representation process move more quickly0 " because em-
ployers are otherwise able to undermine union representation claims
by delaying the workers' right of free choice. Consequently, although
British employers may not prove as litigious or as likely to play for
time in which to mount an effective anti-union campaign as their
American counterparts, one should not be surprised if unions com-
plain about the effectiveness of the procedures. However, if CIR
investigation of a representation claim indicated that the employer
were attempting to undermine the union during a delay, the Com-
mission could report such a finding to NIRC. There is no indication
that the Court will brook interference with the administration of the
Act and, where the Court's own processes are at stake, the contempt
power promises to catch short employers as well as unions. The
American statutory scheme provides an unfavorable contrast by
encouraging delay without providing judicial powers to a specialized
labor court able to end the delay.
165. United States employers' attempts to frustrate union organization campaigns
by initiating § 9(c) representation petitions before the union is ready to face a
representation election are barred by an NLRB Regulation that if
a petition is filed by an employer, the petitioner must supply, within 48 hours
after filing, proof of demand for recognition by the labor organization named II
the petition and, in the event the labor organization named is the incumbent
representative of the unit involved, a statement of the objective considerations
demonstrating reasonable grounds for believing that the labor organization has
lost its majority status.
29 C.F.R. § 101.17 (1972).
166. See, e.g., International Hod Carriers Building & Common Laborers, 135 N.L,R,B.
1153 (1962).
167. Car Collection Co., Ltd. v. Transport and General Workers Union, (1972] 2
All E.R. 97.
168. Effective May 15, 1961, the NLRB delegated to its regional directors "Its
power under § 9 to determine the unit appropriate for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining, to investigate and provide for hearings, and determine whether a question of
representation exists, and to direct an election or take a secret ballot under subsec-
tion (c) or (e) of section 9 and certify the results thereof." 26 Fed. Reg. 3911 (1961).
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Of course, the recognition procedures have been established with
a view towards reaching settlements without the recommendations
of the Commission and the orders of the Court. Although in the
United States the NLRA does not so explicitly promote the parties'
own arrangements, many employers and unions do enter into recog-
nition agreements without a secret ballot and, indeed, some are com-
pelled to do so on the basis of authorization cards by the Board. 00 It
would appear, therefore, that private settlements may be encouraged
by statutory machinery less unwieldy and delay-prone than that in
the Act. Moreover, the statutory provisions which provide more pro-
tection to union-employer relationships established through court
order than to those voluntarily negotiated contradict the spirit of
voluntarism. Unions and employers which settle or accede to CIR
recommendations without the ballot are more exposed to another
union's raids than they would be otherwise. The principal reason
for this is that a union which files for recognition must be both regis-
tered and independent, and it would detract from the importance
of registration and independence to allow unions which lack these
characteristics the same protection as those which have them.
So far as the recognition issue is concerned, the most difficult, and
important, of the unanswered questions relate to the principle of
exclusivity. It is quite clear that the Act obligates an employer con-
fronted with an NIRC order to negotiate with none other than the
"sole" or exclusive bargaining agent. Although joint panels of bar-
gaining agents are contemplated by the statute, the indirect effect
here may be to rationalize the untidiness of British trade union
structure and to squeeze out the weaker or smaller unions and
groups of shop stewards who now negotiate on behalf of a relatively
small group of employees. Further, it seems likely that factory or
plant comprehensive agreements can be more effectively negotiated
where management is dealing with a sole bargaining agent. But union
jurisdictional conflicts are typically bitter and, to the extent that the
recognition machinery is used by unions and employers, the first
years of Section 45 will be difficult ones indeed.
To some degree, however, the impact of the Act's provisions on
recognition will be more gently felt if the parties devise their own
solutions, as the framers of the statute hoped. Moreover, just as
the Act provides for bargaining by a joint negotiating panel of trade
unions, The Code of Industrial Relations Practice encourages co-
169. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., Inc., 395 U.S. 575 (1969); United Mine Workers
of America v. Arkansas-Oak Flooring Co., 351 US. 62 (1956).
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operation between the stewards of different unions bargaining with
one employer. 70 Therefore, unions which negotiate alongside other
organizations, where relationships cut across the lines of an ap-
propriate unit, need not fight to determine which party will be
obliterated. The joint panel arrangement allows unions to come
together in a process short of amalgamation.
The exclusivity issue will be troublesome for another reason as
well. The individual contract of employment, which has little weight
in the United States, is an important element in British labor laws. 1"
No change in this tradition is attempted by the Act. Yet, the Act does
not clarify the rights and responsibilities of unions with regard to
non-union employees who are included in the bargaining unit. In
the U.S., exclusivity means that a union bargains for all within the
unit regardless of union membership and that a union owes each
worker a duty of fair representation. 17 2 But, contrary to United States
law, the individual contract of employment is retained in Britain even
where the collective relationship between labor and management
exists. Indeed, some of the Act's provisions relating to strike liability
are framed around the inducement to breach an individual con-
tract of employment. 73 The unions will apparently bargain only
for those in the unit who desire to have them do so.' 74
Several provisions of the Act seem to look toward American-style
exclusivity, but appearances here are deceptive. First, the Act amends
the Contracts of Employment Act of 196317r so as to obligate the
170. CODE OF PRAcrIcE, supra note 113, 112-15.
171. See generally C. GRUNFELD, MODERN TRADE UNION LAW (1966); K. WV/DDIiRI1UIIN,
THE WORKER AND THE LAW 51-94 (2d ed. 1971); 0. Kahn-Freund, Legal Framework, in
THE SYSTEM OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN 45-52 (A. Flanders & H. Clegg
eds. 1954).
172. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953);
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
173. Ind. Rela. Act 1971, § 96. Liability premised on inducement of such breaches
provides a sizeable deterrent to non-registered trade unions' organization of industrial
action simply because of the omnipresence and nature of individual contracts of cnt-
ployment. See generally R. HEPPLE & R. O'HICoINS, INDIVIDUAL EstiLOYMIENT LAW (1971).
174. The individual contract issue aside, the British wished to avoid involvement
in the complicated, frustrating, and largely ineffectual duty of fair representation
doctrine so prominent in United States law. See Herring, The "Fair Represcntalion"
Doctrine: An Effective Weapon Against Racial Discrimination?, 24 MD. L. REv. 113
(1964). This duty comes fully into play only when the union speaks for all In-
dividuals in the bargaining unit. Whether the British can avoid the problems raised
by the duty through mere avoidance of legal doctrine is questionable. Even nore
puzzling is the encouragement provided to individual bargaining in legislation designed
to promote union responsibility.
175. Contracts of Employment Act 1963, cA9, amended by Ind. Rela. Act 1971,
§§ 19, 20, 21 (amplified by Sched. 2). For a discussion of the purposes of such notifica.
tion and past experience under the 1963 Act see 318 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) 1352-71
(1971). The amendment of the 1963 Act by § 20 of the Industrial Relations Act was
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employer to notify the employee of the grievance procedure which
he may utilize. This obligation might reasonably imply that all work-
ers have access to the procedure negotiated and that the union be
held responsible for processing the grievances of non-unionists. How-
ever, it is possible that the Act's framers contemplated the existence
of non-negotiated procedures for non-unionists in an othenvise
unionized work place. Professor Selwyn, in one of the early writings
on the Act,176 said that a union has no responsibility to process
grievances for non-unionists. If this is true, it will be necessary,
where designating orders are obtained, to provide a parallel proce-
dure for non-union employees. Secondly, the statutory provision for
the agency shop17 might reasonably imply adoption of American-
style exclusivity. In an agency shop, the individual's freedom of choice
regarding membership is preserved, but no premium is placed upon
being a non-union member, i.e., a "free rider," as would be the case
if all payments could be avoided. The "free rider" problem, and
thus the chief rationale for the agency shop, derives from a union's
ability to negotiate for all within the union and its obligation to
represent all fairly.'78 However, the framers of the Act did not articu-
late the "free rider" argument, which attracted Senator Taft during
the 1947 debate in this country,"7 and we must assume that the agency
shop was allowed for other reasons. Thus, without statutory or con-
tractual instruction to the contrary, representation of non-unionists
clearly overstates what the British intended in the Industrial Rela-
tions Act of 1971.
B. Union Security Arrangements
Under the Act, a worker covered by an agency shop agreement may
refuse to become a member of a trade union if he agrees to pay "ap-
not all to the liking of the Opposition, however. Notification must be made of em-
ployees' § 5 rights, which include the right not to belong to a trade union. See 822
PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 1161-76 (1971).
176. N. SF.LwYN, GUIDE TO THE INDUSTRIMAL RELATIONS Acr. 1971 (1971).
177. The agency shop provisions are in Ind. Rela. Act 1971. , 11-16. Post.cntry
dosed shop agreements can be made if approved by the Industrial Court but arc
intended to apply only in very limited situations, i.e., when a closed shop is necessary
to maintenance of union benefits. Examples offered during debate concerning where
closed shops would be allowed were the entertainment and shipping industries. See
813 PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 926-28 (1971), and debate there following. See The Times
(London), May 6, 1972, at 4, col. 1.
178. See S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 6 (1947) cited in 1 LErtqaATtvE His-
TORY OF THE LABOR MfANAGEMENTr RELATIONS Acr 1947, at 409, 412-13 (1948). Cf. NLRB
v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963); Radio Officers Union v. NLRB. 347 US.
17 (1954).
179. For a discussion of legislative history see Union Starch & Ref. Co.. 87 N.L.R.B.
779 (1949), enforced, 186 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 815 (1951).
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propriate contributions to the trade union in lieu of membership
in it."'' 30 Unions and employers may enter into collective agreements
containing agency shop clauses. If the employer is unwilling to do
so, and the union is unregistered, there will be no agency shop. A
registered union may, however, apply to the Industrial Court, and
thus trigger a balloting procedure. Preliminarily, the Court must
determine whether the petitioning union has "negotiating" rights
with the employer. If the union has such rights, the Court requests
the CIR to take charge of the matter "with a view to the taking of a
ballot on the question of whether an agency shop agreement should
be made between the parties."''1 The Commission determines what
group of workers should be covered by the ballot and reports to the
Court on this matter. If a majority of the workers "eligible to vote"
or not less than two-thirds of those who actually voted are in favor
of an agency shop, the employer must enter into such a contract.18-"
If a majority of those eligible to vote or two-thirds of those voting
do not vote in favor of the agency shop, the Court shall make an
order directing that no agency shop agreement involving the work-
ers in question shall be negotiated for two years beginning with the
date upon which the result of the election was reported by the Com-
mission to the Court. Any such agreement made during that period
shall be "void."' 83
This is to be contrasted with the procedures relating to the recog-
nition of trade unions both in the United States and Great Britain,
where a majority of those voting is required. 8 4 Moreover, this pro.
vision compares unfavorably with the now repealed portions of Taft-
Hartley which provided for union shop elections in which, once
again, a mere majority of those voting resulted in the creation of
that form of union security. Employers will of course often nego-
tiate the agency shop voluntarily but, where they do not, the voting
is likely to prove a waste of the taxpayers' money, just as have union
shop elections in the United States: Workers overwhelmingly vote
for such clauses.18 5 One would assume that voting will seem even
more superfluous in Britain, where union security concepts are more
180. Ind. Rela. Act 1971, § 11; appropriate contributions are defined in § 8.
181. Id. § 11.
182. Id. § 13.
183. Id. § 13(3)(b). Where an agency shop has been instituted by a negotiation or
an election, an application to rescind the agreement may be made by one.fifth of the
workers covered by it. The Court will rescind the agreement unless a majority of those
eligible to vote or those voting are in favor of the provision's continuance. Id. § 14, 15.
184. New York Handkerchief Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 114 F.2d 144 (7th Cir. 1940), cert.
denied, 311 U.S. 704 (1941).
185. See H.R. REP. No. 1082, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., 2-3 (1951).
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firmly established' 8 -albeit on a more informal basis. Accordingly, this
aspect of the Act seems to be wasted motion, and the "two-thirds" pro-
vision, violating the concept of majority rule, can only cause acrimony
and hard feelings.
In contrast to American law,' 8s an employee who objects on "the
grounds of conscience both to being a member of a trade union and
paying contributions to a trade union" may, in lieu of membership,
agree to make equivalent contributions to a charity to be de-
termined by agreement between him and the union.18 8 Whether
conscience includes non-religious moral convictions is not clear at
this time.18 9 In the United States employees who have had religious
objections to joining a union have been permitted to pay dues and
initiation fees in lieu thereof.'10
In the United States, Taft-Hartley specifically prohibits the dosed
shop, although some of the provisions make it possible for such an
arrangement to survive in the construction industry.'9 ' In Great
Britain the Act makes the pre-entry closed shop void,9 2 even though
its existence in that country on both the formal and informal basis
is widespread. A worker who is refused employment because of a
closed shop provision may apply to the Industrial Court and, if the
Court finds that the clause in question is in "substantial derogation"
of Section 5 rights, the Court declares the provision void. As in
the United States, this legislation will strike down formal contract
provisions, but may have little impact upon informal arrangements,
186. For instance, "the 'closed shop' affected in 1964 about three and three-quar-
ters million workers in Britain, about one in six of the total work force but about two
in five of trade union members." K. WEDDERM UN, THE Wo R.KER ND THE Lw 461 (2d cd.
1971). See also W. MCCARTHY, THE CLOSED SHOP (1964).
187. No exceptions are contained in NLRA & 8(a)(3), 29 US.C. § 185(a)(3) (1970),
which allows union shop agreements under which membership in the union is re-
quired after thirty days employment. Membership, in fact, means payment of initiation
and dues. See NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963).
188. Ind. Rela. Act 1971, § 9(b).
189. For a typical discussion of the moral vs. conscientious objector controversy,
see 318 P'.A. DaB.H.L. (5th ser.) 655-86 (1971).
190. Union Starch & Refining Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 779 (1949), enforced, 186 F.2d
1008 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 815 (1951). Indeed the Supreme Court has made
it clear that the strongest mandatory form of union security is the agency shop. This
is quite contrary to a very general impression held by both lawyers and workers, i.e.,
that membership and the union shop can be required. See Note, Judicial Enforcement
of Union Disciplinary Fines, 76 YALE L.J. 563 (1967).
191. NLRA § 8(0, 29 U.S.C. 158(f) (1970) encourages the de facto dosed shop
in the construction industry, because it both permits pre-hirc collective agreements,
which allow the union to be recognized prior to a demonstration of majority support,
and provides a seven day grace period for the union shop. NLRA § 8(f), along with
Local 357, Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 US. 667 (1961), legitimize the hiring hall, which
perpetuates the closed shop on a de facto basis.
192. Ind. Rela. Act 1971, § 7.
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i.e., on the de facto closed shop. These arrangements are common
and well-established in British industry. Thus, the Act encourages
acrimony over an issue important to many unions without any real
prospect of changing the conditions which triggered the individual
employee's complaint.
Britain will permit "approved closed shop agreements." These are
so-called post-entry closed shops, equivalent to our union shop (mem-
bership being required after employment). Here too a worker to
whom the agreement applies may pay appropriate contributions to a
charity in lieu of membership or the payment of monies to the union.
But the parties cannot make a post-entry closed shop agreement
themselves. Application must be made to NIRC by both parties
jointly. If there has been no ballot rejecting the closed shop within
the past two years, the Court will send the matter to the Commis.
sion for examination. The Commission must satisfy itself that cer-
tain criteria are met. The Commission may sanction an agreement
where it is necessary to enable employees to be organized or to con-
tinue to be organized, to maintain reasonable terms and conditions
of employment as well as reasonable prospects of continued employ-
ment, to promote or maintain stable arrangements for collective bar-
gaining relating to such workers, or to prevent collective bargaining
agreements from being frustrated. 193 If the Commission finds that
all factors warrant a closed shop, and the purposes involved could
not be achieved through the agency shop, the Court orders a ballot
to be taken, if such has been applied for, or simply approves the
closed shop. The voting requirements for approved closed shops are
identical to those for agency shops-either a majority of those eligible
to vote or two-thirds of those voting must support this form of union
security. It should be noted that the amendment to the Act which
established the "approved closed shop" was aimed at the peculiar
problems of two or three industries,9 4 and such shops will probably
be approved in very few cases.
Taken as a whole, the union security provisions generate much
wasted motion, since the closed shop prohibitions will be nearly im-
possible to enforce, the approved closed shop criteria are difficult to
193. Ind. Rela. Act 1971, Sched. I. pt. I, 5(1). For a discussion of the efcct of
these criteria on the scope of the closed shop exception see 813 PARL. DEn. H.C. (6th
ser.) 1011-34 (1971).
194. The central two being the entertainment and shipping industries, see note
120 supra. See also debate following quoted material at 813 PArL. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.)
929-1082 (1971); 822 PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 941-42 (1971). It should be remembered
however that attempts to retain pre-entry closed shops in these industries were sttc.
cessfully resisted. See 318 PARL. DEB. H.i. (5th ser.) 919-27, 950-1024 (1971).
1460
Vol. 81: 1421, 1972
Taft-Hartley Comes to Great Britain
satisfy, and the agency shop elections will be mere formalities. The
various procedures and prohibitions also undermine somewhat the
Act's larger goal of promoting union responsibility and eliminating
fragmented bargaining. These defects may be tempered, however, by
management's statutory right to "encourage" union membership
through non-coercive advice.195 One must assume that, for the sake of
amicable relations, many British employers will make good use of this
right.
C. Enforcement of Collective Bargaining Agreements and the Right
to Strike
The malaise of British industrial relations consists of both frag-
mented bargaining and the unconstitutional (in breach of agreed
upon procedures) or unofficial (unauthorized) work stoppage. To
some extent, statutory procedures concerning recognition and the ap-
propriate bargaining unit cope with the former problem. But just
as the alleged contractual irresponsibility of trade unions prompted
Congress to pass the Taft-Hartley amendment, making labor con-
tracts enforceable, so also has Britain's labor unrest led Parliament
to embrace enforceability: The Industrial Relations Act creates a
"conclusive presumption" that a collective bargaining agreement is
a "legally enforceable contract" 1906 and allows the parties to escape
this presumption only by expressly specifying non-enforceability in
the agreement. 97 In both countries legislative concern focussed on
the disruption of orderly negotiation or grievance procedures by "wild-
cat" or unofficial strike action.3 8 But the solutions devised differ
markedly.
1. The Role of the Collective Bargaining Agreement
It is important to understand that, under the Industrial Relations
Act, the employer's right to discharge an employee for any reason, 00
including the exercise of the strike weapon,2 00 and the employee's
195. Ind. Rela. Act 1971, § 5(3).
196. Ind. Rela. Act 1971, § 34(1).
197. Id. § 34(2).
198. For the United States, see S. REP. No. 105, Pt. 1, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 15-18 (1947).
199. As summarized in dicta by Lord Reid in Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40, 63:
The law regarding master and servant is not in doubt. There cannot be specific
performance of a contract of service, and the master can terminate the contract
with his servant at any time and for any reason or for none. But if he does so
in a manner not warranted by the contract, he must pay damages for breach
of contract.
200. Dismissal for striking was possible without the incurrence by the employer of
breach of contract responsibility because a strike was itself considered a breach. K.
WEDDERBURN, TnE WORKER AND THE LAW 109 (2d ed. 1971).
1461
The Yale Law Journal
right to strike or engage in slowdowns, are governed almost exclusive-
ly by an individual's contract of employment and by the unfair dis-
missal provisions of the Act.2 0 1 By contrast, under the principles of
exclusivity in American labor law, these matters are typically gov-
erned by the collective bargaining agreement, which almost com-
pletely submerges any individual contract of employment. 20 2 Of ne-
cessity, given their central importance, American collective bargain-
ing agreements are typically comprehensive and precise in their terms.
This presents a stark contrast to Britain, and to most other indus-
trially advanced countries, where the formal collective agreement,
quite often an industry-wide document, speaks merely in terms of
minimum wages and conditions of employment.
203
The Industrial Relations Act accords a central role to the in-
dividual contract of employment. Under the Act, it is an unfair in-
dustrial practice for "any person, in contemplation or furtherance of
an industrial dispute, knowingly to induce or threaten to induce an-
other person to break a contract to which that other person is a
party" unless the party so inducing or threatening is a registered
trade union within the meaning of the Act, or is an individual act-
ing "within the scope of his authority on behalf of a [registered] trade
union."20 4 The new provision, carrying with it the potential for un-
limited judgments for unlawful stoppages, is the Act's most formid-
able weapon against strikes by unregistered unions. The burden im-
posed upon the union in many instances may be substantial, because
the notice provisions of contracts of employment of individual em-
ployees may vary considerably. It is quite possible that the union will
be obligated to refrain from striking or engaging in other forms of
201. Ind. Rela. Act 1971, § 22.
202. This has been definitively established ever since the Supreme Court's land-
mark decision in J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (19-14). Because American labor
law seeks affirmatively to promote unionization and employee solidarity, the statutory
scheme, as interpreted by J1. Case, seeks to discourage individual advantages which
will lead to divisiveness.
203. See Bok, Reflections on the Distinctive Character of American Labor Laws,
84 HARv. L. REv. 1394, 1436 (1971).
204. Ind. Rela. Act 1971, § 96(1). Until 1971, inducing an individual breach of
an employment contract was immunized from liability by the Trades Disputes Act
of 1906, 6 Edw. 7, c.47, §§ 1, 3. But that Act did not immunize the secondary boycott,
Under the new Act, it must be remembered, the liability imposed is not tort liability
or liability for civil or criminal conspiracy. Rather, if an individual acts without the
authority of a registered union to persuade others to strike in breach of their in-
dividual contracts, whether the strike is primary or secondary, he commits an unfair
industrial practice. Action against him can only be taken in the NIRC. Thus the
secondary boycott exception to the immunity provided by the Trades Disputes Act
of 1906 is eliminated. The Solicitor General referred to § 96(1) as a "narrow modest"
proposal. 811 PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 1762 (1971). But the Opposition characterized
it as not only "intolerable" but "vicious." 811 PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 1703 (1971).
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economic pressure until the workers or the union have given the em-
ployer notice of termination for each individual contract and the time
required in each contract between notice and actual termination has
elapsed. Moreover, unregistered unions cannot trigger industrial ac-
tion where the procedural agreement which sets forth the manner for
dispute resolution has been breached, even though the parties do not
intend the agreement to be enforceable in court. On the other hand,
registered unions may strike or engage in other kinds of economic pres-
sure even though due notice for the individual contract of employ-
ment has not been provided or the procedure agreement has not been
followed by the union.
20 5
Similarly, the Act directly addresses the issue of unfair dismissals
of employees, rather than leaving the problem to negotiation and to
the collective-agreement. Section 22 of the Act protects employees200
against an unfair dismissal and makes such employer conduct an un-
fair industrial practice.20 7 American law does, of course, bar unfair
discharges if they represent discrimination against union member-
ship, or are in retaliation for other concerted activities but the closer
American analogue to Section 22 is the "just cause" provision, typi-
cally found in collective agreements, which imposes a burden on the
employer to evidence a substantial reason for the discharge.2 08 A key
advantage of Britain's statutory approach is that all employees are
protected against unfair dismissals, while in America collective agree-
ments protect only a minority of the labor force. The British Act
also innovates by providing "conciliation officers" to administer the
unfair dismissal rule, a feature conducive to the voluntary settle-
ment of disputes which has no counterpart either in privately ne-
gotiated American grievance-arbitration machinery or in the unfair
labor practice provisions of the NLRA.
205. See the thorough treatment of notice and the right to strike in N. SE.w',%
GUIDE TO THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ACT 1971, at 138.43 (1971).
206. It should be noted that the section protects "employees," not the broader
class, "workers." An employee is "an individual who has entered into or works under
(or, where the employment has ceased, worked under) a contract of employment.
' Ind.
Rela. Act 1971, § 167.
That a conscious choice was made between the two terms is apparent from the dialogue
at 318 PasL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) 1399-1402 (1971).
207. That the intent of the Government here was to create a third right in addition
to the right to redundancy payments or to the right to sue in contract it a breach
had occurred is apparent from 318 PARL. Dan. H.L. (5th ser.) 1388-92 (1971). For a
discussion of law and proposals prior to the Act see G. CLARK, REiIES FoR UNjusr
DISMISSAL: PROPOSALS FoaL LEGISLATION (1970); Levy, The Role of Law in the United
States and England in Protecting the Worker From Discharge and Discrimination, 18
LNT'L AND COMP. L.Q. 558 (1969).
208. F. ELKouRi & E. ELKouR, supra note 63, at 410-13.
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But, compared with American practice, the British approach is not
without flaws. First, the Act apparently places the burden of proving
a dismissal is unfair upon the worker once the employer has pro-
vided his reason for the discharge .200 Accordingly, the Act may pro-
vide less substantial protection than American "just cause" clauses
in collective agreements. Second, the Act appears to allow an em-
ployer to dismiss any worker for engaging in any kind of strike. The
appearance, however, may be deceptive. The Industrial Court may
hold that Section 22's prohibition on unfair dismissals precludes dis-
charge of employees for engaging in strike activity for registered
unions, just as American arbitrators often hold that dismissal for
union activity is inconsistent with a "just cause" provision in the col-
lective agreement. Section 5 of the Act, which protects involvement
in union activity, supports this view. At any rate, British manage-
ment will not have much flexibility: An employee dismissed for strike
activity must be reinstated if other striking employees of that em-
ployer have been reinstated 210 or were never similarly dismissed.2"
Though an American employer cannot discharge a worker for en-
gaging in a walkout,212 he can permanently replace the worker, even
if other workers are not replaced.
213
Finally, the British scheme may be crippled by a substantial reluc-
tance in Britain to compel reinstatement as a remedy for unfair dis.
missal because of the common law view that the courts cannot com-
pel the performance of personal services. 21 4 This view is reflected
209. See Hanna, You're Fired, The Sunday Times (London), July 23, 1972, at 53,
col. 1.
210. Ind. Rela. Act 1971, § 26(2)(b).
211. Ind. Rela. Act 1971, § 26(2)(a). It should be noted that once again registration
is important since the third clause of § 26 is applicable only to situations where dis.
missal or refusal to reinstate was premised on the exercise of § 5(1) rights, which are
enjoyed only by members of registered trade unions. 318 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.)
1941-42 (1971). For a general description of the section's intent, see 318 PARs. DB. HIL.
(5th ser.) 1483-84 (1971). A proviso which would have limited the protection of the
section only to pre-strike activities was eliminated in the House of Lords, 321 PAI'L.
DEa. H.L. (5th ser.) 753-60 (1971). This elimination was upheld in the House of Com-
mons, 822 PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 1345-48 (1971) apparently because the proviso
conflicted with recommendation of the 1970 ILO Conference.
212. NLRA § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970); NLRA § 13, 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1970). Sec gcn-
erally Getman, The Protection of Economic Pressure by Section 7 of the National
Labor Relations Act, 115 UNIV. OF PA. L. REV. 1195 (1967); Gould, The Status of Un-
authorized and "Wildcat" Strikes Under the National Labor Relations Act, 52 CORNELL
L.Q. 672 (1967).
213. See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938). Sec also
NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
214. Kahn-Freund, Legal Framework, in THE SysrENI OF INDUsTRIAL Ra'LIONS IN
GREAT BRITAIN (A. Flanders & H. Clegg eds. 1954).
For a somewhat critical discussion of the absence of reinstatement as a remedy, see
K. WEDDERaURN, THE WORKER AND THE LAW 81-85, 137-51 (2d ed. 1971). The other
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in the Act. The NIRC or Industrial Tribunals may assess damages,
but cannot impose reinstatement or re-engagement as a remedy.21-
However, re-engagement may be recommended by a Tribunal, and
the threat of damages may, of course, be used to encourage reinstate-
ment. In the United States, reinstatement is a well-accepted remedy
in cases arising under the National Labor Relations Act.210 Arbitrators
appointed under collective bargaining agreements are more prone
to reinstate workers than to award back-pay. The absence of simi-
lar authority in Britain could contribute to industrial strife rather
than reduce it. Trade unions retain the right to strike to compel
reinstatement when it is not forthcoming or where resort has not
been made to the appropriate machinery.217 In America, workers
generally abjure self-help measures in discharge cases, since the
remedy of reinstatement is available through arbitration. Although
the prospect of damages may promote settlement providing for re-
engagement, the process could be bitter and lengthy in Britain if
the parties have not provided their own machinery of settlement.
Thus, although the Act affords the collective agreement a lesser
role than it enjoys in the United States, the Act's success may turn
on its ability to encourage labor and management to compose agree-
ments of greater scope and precision than is customary in Britain.
Several features of the Act provide such encouragement.
On the subject of unfair dismissals, the parties may obtain "desig-
nating orders" which permit them to devise their own machinery,
so long as it provides benefits equal or superior to those contained
in the statute.218 Although other problems may provide a more sub-
stantial impetus to the arbitral process, this provision could con-
section of the Act dealing with specific performance, § 128, proscribes enforced specific
performance of employment contracts and seems to be in harmony with the historical
position concerning employee protection.
215. Ind. Rela. Act 1971, § 106.
216. Reinstatement is specifically provided as an affirmative remedy under NLRA
§ 10(c), 29 U.S.C. 160(c) (1970). Cf. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
As to the effectiveness of this remedy see Comment, A'.L.R.B. Power to Award Damages
in Unfair Labor Practice Cases, 84 Hagv. L. REv. 1670, 1674-75 (1971).
217. This right is retained since "it is not specifically made an unfair industrial
practice to take industrial action to secure the reinstatement of a dismissed employee,
even if a complaint is currently before a tribunal or the tribunal has found the dis-
missal to be fair." Rideout, Statutes: The Industrial Relations Act 1971, 34 Mo. L.
REv. 655, 657 (1971).
218. Ind. Rela. Act 1971, § 31. Section 31(2)(a) was designed to prevent collusion between
a company and a company dominated union to secure a procedure agreement setting up
a dismissal procedure under company control. See 318 PARt. DEt. H.L. (5th ser.) 1508-10
(1971); 822 PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 1355-58 (1971). The Government definitely hoped
that § 31 would lead to the extensive development of consensual dismissal procedures.
Section 31(2)(e) was amended to remove any foreseeable bars in the statute itself to this
development. See 318 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) 1510-13 (1971).
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stitute the beginning of a system of arbitration similar to that in the
United States. Because of the large number of these cases, Section
22 could be one of the most important provisions of the Act. However,
one important factor stands in the path of this development-and that
is the attitude of the unions. Part of their policy of "non.co-opera-
tion" is a refusal by TUC-affiliated unions to apply for designating
orders. While this position preserves consistency with overall trade
union policy toward the Act, it ironically prevents workers from
escaping the clutches of the Act's institutions and rules.
Like Taft-Hartley, the Act imposes an obligation to bargain col-
lectively upon the employer, and this may encourage the negotiation
of comprehensive agreements. This is particularly likely since the
remedy for failure to bargain collectively is the imposition on the em-
ployer of contract terms by the government.219 While contrary to the
freedom of contract principles found in American labor law, and
once adhered to in Britain, this solution should avoid the frustra-
tions this country has faced in fashioning remedies for breach of the
duty to bargain. The imposition of terms may also help some of the
more obstreperous unions to accept the notion of comprehensive
agreements.
It must be anticipated, however, that a good number of parties
in Britain-usually at union insistence-will choose to make their
agreements non-enforceable under Section 34(2). In Britain provi-
sion for this possibility was appropriate since, as the Donovan Com-
mission noted, many collective agreements are not in a state to be
enforced.2 20 Looking to the long term, the Act, through the Code of
Practice, attempts to improve agreements by inducing in the par-
ties a sense of responsibility about bargaining.221 If problems de-
velop because of the ineffectiveness or absence of grievance proce-
dures, the Act establishes a means of coping with this problem which
is entirely foreign to the American experience. The Secretary of State
or parties may apply to the Industrial Court claiming that existing
procedure agreements are unsuitable to settle "disputes or grievances
properly and fairly" or that a strike or irregular industrial action
short of a strike is occurring contrary to the "terms or intentions" of
the agreement that has been negotiated.222 The Court may then, in
219. Ind. Rela. Act 1971, §§ 56, 126, 127.
220. ROYAL COMM.s. ON TRADE UNIONS, REPORT, supra note 65, at 126.
221. Paragraphs 1-23 enumerate the responsibilities of management, trade unions,
employers' associations and the individual employee, portraying an ideal scheme based
on awareness of a community of interests. CODE OF PRACTICE, supra note 113.
222. Ind. Rela. Act 1971, § 37(a).
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some circumstances, impose grievance machinery upon the parties, a
remedy once again antithetical to the collective bargaining philoso-
phy incorporated in § 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act.223
Unlike the Act, American law does not provide stop-gap solutions
where the parties have made their agreement non-enforceable. Al-
though the possibility was discussed at the time of Taft-Hartley's en-
actment,224 the non-enforceable agreement has been a rare phenome-
non in the United States. It raises, however, difficult legal questions-
sufficiently difficult to make understandable the British desire to avoid
them through detailed statutory mechanisms.
First, suppose that an American employer acquiesces to a union
demand that the contract not contain a no-strike pledge 22 3 or that
it contain an express employer waiver of the right to sue for breach
of the contract. Since § 301 of the L.M.R.A. creates substantive law
predicated on contract,22 the courts would presumably respect such
provisions. A second, and more difficult question, is whether a union
would violate its duty to bargain in good faith by insisting on such
forms of non-enforceability. Because that duty presumably requires
the parties to have a good faith intention to reach an agree-
ment,2 27 the union could not simply insist on having no collective
agreement. If, however, the union's demand were only to exclude
the no-strike clause or to include the right-to-sue waiver, the mat-
ter would be less clear. Arguably, the manner in which disputes are
to be resolved (e.g., strikes, arbitration, court suits, etc.) is a condi-
tion of employment and a mandatory subject of bargaining, and, if
so, insistence upon a particular view to the point of impasse would
not violate the duty to bargain in good faith.22 8 While there is au-
thority that a particular remedy for contract breach, i.e., the require-
ment of a performance bond, is not a mandatory item of bargain-
223. 29 U.S.C. 158(d) (1970). However, voluntary settlement is still the British goal.
See 810 PmL. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 1520-26, 1557-66 (1971); 319 PAt.. Dan. H.L, (5th scr.)
220-25 (1971).
Conciliation was emphasized by a Government amendment which required any ap-
plicant to Industrial Court to notify the Secretary of State, who would then offer
his services in the cause of promoting agreement. 810 PARL. Dan. H.C. (5th ser.) 1577-
1600 (1971). The opposition, however, still feared the effects of introducing law into
the shop via imposition. 810 PARt.. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 154143, 1546-52 (1971).
224. S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., Pt. I, 15-18 (1947).
225. The most prominent example of a union attempt to exclude a no-strike clause
was made by the United Mine Workers, who insisted that their no-strike pledge be
operative only if the workers were "able and willing" to work. See S. Au.;s)Y, JoH,;
L. LEwis: AN UNAUTHORIZED BioGRAPnY 337 (1970).
226. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
227. See United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers v. NLRB, 409 F. 2d 150
(D.C. Cir. 1969). But see NLRB v. American National Insurance Co., 343 US. 395 (1932).
228. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 647 (1959).
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ing,22 the Supreme Court in Boys Markets stated that the employer's
remedy for union breach of a no-strike pledge was critical to the
very existence of the employer's contract right to be free of strikes
during the term of the agreement. 30 This argues for construing the
question of remedy as a mandatory subject of bargaining.
As a practical matter, however, the no-strike pledge and the em-
ployer's right to sue often constitute the vital quid pro quo for the
employer's acceptance of arbitration. If, as the Steelworkers Trilo-
gy 231 teaches, arbitration is essential to industrial peace, and if, as
Boys Markets teaches, an enforceable no-strike pledge may sometimes
be essential to maintaining the integrity and attractiveness of arbitra-
tion, we might expect the Court to find a breach of the duty to bar-
gain when a union insists to the point of impasse on excluding the
no-strike pledge or on securing a waiver-of-suit from the employer.
It does appear, however, that a union can more modestly insist that the
employer seek his remedy for breach of the no-strike pledge in the
forum of arbitration, rather than in a court; in Drake Bakeries, 2 32 tile
Court stayed judicial proceedings where the employer had a con-
tractual right to grieve and arbitrate union violation of the no-strike
pledge.
2. Regulation of Industrial Warfare
Section 36(l)(a) makes it an unfair industrial practice for any party
to a collective agreement to break it where the contract is enforceable.
The primary question here is whether the parties will utilize the
provision. The Labor Government, in its proposed anti-strike legis-
lation which provided for a "conciliation pause," placed responsibility
for bringing actions to the judiciary in the hands of the Minister
of Employment and Productivity. In vain, employers sought the same
statutory scheme from the Conservative Government in 1970 and
1971.
To critics of the Act, this employer lobbying confirmed that man-
229. NLRB v. American Compress Warehouse, Div. of Frost-United Co., 350 F.2d
365 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 US. 982 (1966).
230. Boys Market, Inc. v. Local 770, Retail Clerks, 398 U.S. 235, 249 (1970). On
the closely related question of whether no-strike injunctions are a procedural or sub.
stantive remedy, see Lesnick, State-Court Injunctions and the Federal Common Law
of Labor Contracts: Beyond Norris-LaGuardia, 79 HARV. L. REv. 757 (1966).
231. United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 561 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers
of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
232. Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, American Bakery Workers, 370 U.S. 254 (1962).
Cf. Local 721, Packing House Workers v. Needham Packing Co., 376 U.S. 247 (196).
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agement would not take legal action in any event, and that Section
36 was at best an irrelevance. This view was bolstered by the ac-
curate (but nevertheless incomplete) reporting on the American sys-
tem which indicated that employers in the United States rarely sue. 2 33
It was also pointed out that damage actions in the courts based upon
no-strike violations are often withdrawn as part of the settlement
reached after termination of the stoppage.234 Withdrawal of the ac-
tion is often the price of ending the strike. What was pushed into
the background in this discussion, however, was evidence that the
legal right to sue serves as a deterrent against the use of the strike
weapon and that the withdrawal of the suit is often a necessary quid
pro quo for the withdrawal of the strike. Doubters could focus upon
the reluctance of British employers to sue individual workers for
breach of employment contract, a remedy which was available prior
to the passage of the Act.2 35 But large union treasuries, albeit pro-
tected by statutory limitations upon the amount of damages that
may be collected from registered unions,2 30 may present a more in-
viting target than suits which might be entertained against individual
employees. Section 36(2) obliges a party to the agreement to take all
such steps that are "reasonably practicable" to prevent breach, lan-
guage devised specifically for unofficial strike situations where in-
dividual employees, work groups, and shop steward committees, rather
than unions, are normally the offending parties. 37 Since the effec-
tive date of the Act, all indications are that British management will
not be bashful about relying upon litigation where there is no prac-
ticable alternative; indeed, the main criticism now seems to be that
employers are too trigger-happy in filing actions with the Industrial
Court.238
Nevertheless, while the Government may have exhibited wisdom
in refusing to involve itself in enforcing breaches of contracts, and
233. P. Loway, supra note 28.
234. See Gould, On Labor Injunctions, Unions, and the Judges: The Boys Market
Case, 1970 SUPREME CT. REv. 230-31 (1970).
235. Nat'l Coal Bd. v. Galey, [1958] All E.R. 91; Camden v. Lynott, [1966] 1 Q.B. 555.
236. Ind. Rela. Act 1971, § 117. Trade unions of less than 5,000 membership may
be assessed a maximum of D.5,000; those with 5,000 to 25,000 members, a maximum of
£25,000; 25,000 to 100,000 a maximum of £50,000; 100,000 or more members, a maximum
of £100,000. In addition a formula recovery limit of up to 104 weeks or £4,160, which-
ever is less, is imposed by § 118 on recoveries involving irregular treatment of members
by trade unions or employee associations, emplo)er violations of the basic rights scc.
tion or unfair dismissal section, or breach by employers or workers organizations of
the basic principles set out in the Act or their own rules.
237. ROYAL CO.om. ON TRADE UNxIOs, REPORT, supra note 65, at 128-40.
238. See generally The Sunday Times (London), July 30, 1972, for background on
last summer's dock strike, which was aggravated by employer readiness to invoke the
Act's remedies.
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while this stance preserves the spirit of voluntarism, government in-
volvement does carry with it the trappings of impartiality. The Na-
tional Labor Relations Board, while it is not primarily concerned
with breach of contract actions, 239 has responsibility for enforcing
secondary boycotts, jurisdictional stoppages and organizational and
recognitional picketing prohibitions contained in Taft-Hartley. 40
Although private parties may bring suits in the first two areas, "41 the
Board has carried most of the burden. That unions have reconciled
themselves to these prohibitions is undoubtedly attributable in part
to the fact that the Board and not employers is the litigant.2 "
The Conservatives did not wish government to impinge unduly
upon the parties' autonomous relationships and feared the politi-
cal undertones of government-initiated litigation.2 43
But, ironically, the case for a government role seems stronger now
that private litigation arising out of the dock strike has polarized
TUG and the Government. If the Commission on Industrial Rela-
tions, for instance, occupied a position similar to that of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board, and could exercise discretion in the
matters that could be heard by the Court, the statute would possess
more flexibility. The CIR or some other agency could screen out
those cases not suited to the judicial forum with its contempt powers.
Perhaps the 1972 dock strike would have been less bitter if the CIR
had been able to break it off before it reached the Court. It would
also help if the CIR could require or encourage the parties to sub-
mit to arbitration. In the United States, the Board has held in the
Collyer Insulated Wire case244 that grievance-machinery is appropri-
ate for deferral purposes where unfair labor practice charges are
filed. Once arbitration begins to flourish in England, an amend-
ment to the Act looking in this direction should be considered.
239. See NLRB v. C. & C. Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421 (1967).
240. NLRA § 8(b), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4), and (7) (1970).
241. Id.
242. Cf. Cox, The Role of Law in Labor Disputes, 39 CORNELL L.Q. 592 (1904). How-
ever, charges must be filed by private parties and, under § 303, employers may file suits
for § 8(b)(4) violations.
243. These were entirely reasonable fears given the militant and politically charged
opposition of the trade union movement to both the Act and the Conservative Govern-
ment responsible for it. See Jacobs, Million May Strike on December 8, The Sunday
Times (London), Nov. 29, 1970, at 3, col. 1; Lewis, Heath Government Taking A Firns
Line Against Growing Turmoil of Walkouts, N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1970, at 3, col. 4;
Lee, Unions Protest as Tories Press Bill to Regulate Labor Relations, N.Y. Times, Dec,
4, 1970, at 13, col. 1; Weinraub, British Workers March In Protest, N.Y. Times, Feb.
22, 1971, at 7, col. 1.
244. 192 N.L.R.B. No. 150 (1971).
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3. Trade Union Reorganization: The Role of Law
Although Professor Turner has contended that making collective
agreements enforceable will simply create friction inside the union
and, if anything, produce industrial warfare on a grander scale,245
the Conservative Party's prophecies are equally plausible. The Gov-
emnment's view is that Section 36 will induce the unions to take a
more active interest in employment conditions at the plant level.240
This, of course, means more staff and technical assistance as well as
involvement in both the negotiation and administration of the contract,
changes which would move Britain toward the American model
insofar as industrial unions are concerned.
But the unions, particularly the Transport and General Workers
Union, have rationalized the absence of central union authority as
"grass roots democracy." They fear that cumbersome procedures for
calling strikes and instituting policy will diminish both the spontaneity
and the effectiveness of the workers' representatives. Also, it may be
that the unions' organizational structure is too weak to support legal
regulation. Even though the impact of law in this context is concededly
long run, the short run may see shop stewards, work groups and other
local officials driven away from the national unions, which bargain
minimum rates, and into the arms of small rival or "breakaway"
unions.247 This would, of course, be antithetical to the objectives of the
Act's framers, and it would most certainly be disruptive. The dynamics
of industrial relations in both the United States and Great Britain
make local union acceptance of orders from Washington, D.C. or
London a very chancy business. The risk is that local leaders have
more to gain from defiance than acquiescence. Quite clearly, Parlia-
ment is relying upon what it hopes to be the law-abiding character
of British workers. After this summer's events, that reliance seems
somewhat questionable.
In the United States, union responsibility for membership ac-
tions exists by virtue of the collective agreement and is governed
generally by Taft-Hartley common law agency principles.248 A mem-
245. Turner, Is Britain Really Strike Prone?: A Review of Incidence, Character, and
Costs of Industrial Conflict (1969).
246. Of course rationalization of trade union structures is also the aim of the Act's
recognition and registration provisions.
247. See generally S. LERER, BR.AKAivAY UNIONS AND rME SMALL TRADE UNIONS (1961).
248. Contractual responsibility in federal and state courts exists by virtue of LMRA ,
§ 301(b), 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1970). Cf. United Construction Workers v. Haslip Bakery
Co., 223 F.2d 872 (4th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 847 (1955). The rule of agency
for the NLRA is contained in 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1970). See Sunset Line & Twine Co.,
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ber's acts are not imputed to the union, generally speaking,2 40 but of-
ficers, including unpaid stewards, can make unions responsible for
their behavior.2 0 Remaining somewhat cloudy is the extent of the
union's obligation in a contempt action, particularly in a Section 301
proceeding where the agreement normally sets forth the steps to be
taken by the union in urging its members back to work. The sanc-
tions for contempt, as John L. Lewis and the United Mine Workers
learned to their dismay, bite into the union's treasury.Y'
The British Act requires unions to use their best endeavors to
prevent breaches of the collective agreement. Such endeavors in-
clude bona fide urgings and, when that cannot achieve the back-to-
work objective, disciplinary action in the form of fines or expulsion.
As stated by Solicitor General Geoffrey Howe:
Section 36 does not necessarily require a union, for example,
to discipline those of its members who do no more than par-
ticipate in an unconstitutional strike. But it does require (and
this is surely reasonable) a union which has itself agreed not
to call, support or finance a strike in given circumstances to
take active steps to discourage and prevent its members or of-
ficials from playing any part in promoting just such a strike.
And this is the main purpose behind Section 36.252
In the recent landmark case, Heaton's Transport, Ltd. v. Trans-
port and General Workers Union,253 the House of Lords upheld an
79 N.L.R.B. 1487, 1508 (1948). Congress was against extending to the NLRA the very
narrow rule of agency contained in the Norris-LaGuardia Act. See Ramsey v. United
Mine Workers, 401 U.S. 302, 309-11 (1971). Cf. United Brotherhood of Carpenters &
Joiners v. United States, 330 U.S. 395 (1947).
249. See 93 CONG. REc. 4022 (1947) (Remarks of Senator Taft). But see United States
v. United Mine Workers, 77 F. Supp. 563 (D.D.C. 1948), af 'd, 177 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1919);
United States v. Bhd. of Railroad Trainmen, 95 F. Supp. 1019 (D.D.C. 1951).
250. See, e.g., NLRB v. Local 135, Teamsters, 267 F.2d 870 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. de.
nied, 361 U.S. 914. But see NLRB v. P. R. Mallory & Co., 237 F.2d 437 (7th CIr. 1956).
251. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947). Cf. Walker v.
Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967). The British Industrial Court is in a much better po-
sition to impose contempt than is the NLRB. See Bartosic and Lanoff, Escalating the
Struggle Against Taft-Hartley Contemnors, 39 Cm. L. REV. 255 (1972).
252. Howe, The Industrial Relations Act and Its Impact on Collective Agreements
and Bargaining Structure, IND. RELA. REV. & REPrORT 8 (reprint, undated).
253. [1972] 3 All E.R. 101. For British reaction to this decision see Elliott, What
the Lords' Decision Means for the Union Leadership, Financial Times (London), July
28, 1972, at 14, col. 3; Hanna, New Decisions on Strike Law May Add to the Chaos, rle
Sunday Times (London), July 30, 1972, at 47, col. 1; Wigham, Ruling the Unions Are
Unable to Enforce, The Times (London), Aug. 1, 1972, at 21, col. 1. Mr. Wighlam, a
member of the Donovan Commission, states that the principal roadblock to union en.
forcement of discipline is the open shop which permits non-unionists to escape the
union's wrath. "The Act attempts .to do virtually contradictory things-to force the
unions to exercise greater central authority and to prevent them from doing so by
giving workers the right to leave their unions whenever they wish without suffering
any adverse consequences." Id. While the charge that workers have the right to leave
whenever they wish is erroneous, nevertheless the criticism is valid and argues per-
suasively for repeal of the closed shop provisions of the Act. It is interesting to note
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Industrial Court ruling, which the Court of Appeals had reversed,254
that shop stewards may be regarded as officers and agents of the
unions who must be disciplined by national officers if the union is
to purge itself of contempt. The House found that the union's
stewards were acting as agents because (1) the union rule book did
not preclude shop steward industrial action, (2) custom and prac-
tice implied the grant of the requisite authority for stewards, (3) shop
stewards were instructed by the union to represent their union and
its members, and (4) the circumstances indicated that the stewards
here were enforcing the national union's policy.2- With regard to
disciplinary actions which should have been taken by the union
against stewards, the Industrial Court had noted simply that no union
rules or policy had been issued to stewards concerning unfair indus-
trial practices.2
56
But how will the unions be induced to take whatever steps are
necessary? While injunctions can be issued against unions, no orders
can be issued compelling individuals to work.257 While the officials
of unregistered unions are exposed to personal liability,2 8 and the
Court has the traditional contempt sanctions to be employed against
union officials and strike leaders, in the final analysis the use of such
procedures merely creates instant martyrdom. The principal reme-
dies are apparently damages against a union treasury, not to be re-
covered against individuals even if they are union officials, and the
deterrent of contempt. Unions threatened with sequestration of their
property (as occurred in Heaton) will think again about their course
of conduct. This, according to the House of Lords in Heaton, is the
"primary method contemplated by the Act" to implement the con-
tempt power..2 59 For unregistered unions the amount of compensa-
tion that may be assessed is unlimited..
20 0
that Professor Cox made this criticism of Taft-Hartley. See Cox, Some Aspects of the
Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 HARv. L. REv. 274, 298-99 (1948). For other
British views on this subject prior to the Act see Roberts, The Unions Must Pay for
Unofficial Strikes, The Sunday Times (London), June 1, 1969, at 12, col. 1; Jacobs,
Unions: Can Mr. Wilson Check the Wildcats?, The Sunday Times (London), Oct. 22.
1967, at 12, col. 2.
254. The NLRC opinion is at [1972] 2 All E.R. 1214; the reversal by the Court
of Appeals is at [1972] 2 All E.R. 1237.
255. [1972] 3 All E.R. 101.
256. [1972] 2 All E.R. 1214, 1232.
257. Ind. Rela. Act 1971, § 128.
258. Ind. Rela. Act 1971, §§ 101, 153.
259. [1972] 3 All E.R. 101, 108.
260. This is because no limit is placed on compensation against unregistered w'orkers'
organizations under § 117 and because § 96 makes all persons liable, with a special
reservation for trade union officials operating within the scope of their authority. In
addition, trade union officials alone are exempted from compensation awards by § 101
while the personal property of union trustees is protected by § 153.
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In the U.S., under Section 301, the Court has held that union of-
ficials are not individually liable.261 The contrary rule prevailing at
the time of the Danbuiy Hatters case, where organized labor literally
had to pass the hat to pay off damages assessed against the union, left
an extremely bad taste in the mouths of unionized workers. Con-
gress did not wish to reintroduce that bitterness under Section 301.
Insofar as the Act permits British employers to sue entities other than
the union itself, it risks serious discord. Insofar as the statute en-
courages employers to sue the unions rather than individuals, it seems
to be soundly conceived.
Finally, and unfortunately, Section 36 apparently requires a union
to take reasonably practicable steps to suppress a work stoppage even
if the stoppage was precipitated by the improper, or indeed unlaw.
ful, conduct of the employer.2 2 One is reminded of the sorry failure
of the courts and the NLRB in this country to protect the rights of
those who incidentally break collective agreement provisions when
striking or picketing to protest employer and union discrimination
against minority group workers..2 03 As this example shows, the Ameri-
can system's greatest deficiency is its refusal to permit considerations
of public policy to override strict legal doctrine. In Britain, fortunately,
the NIRC has remarkably broad discretion to weigh the equities in
assessing damages or in issuing other decrees.204 Certainly, in any ad-
tion against a union, the Court should consider whether the em-
ployer has himself adhered to the standards established in the Code
of Practice.
261. Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238 (1962), and cases discussed
therein.
262. This is because no exceptions are provided in § 36 for action taken in light
of mitigating circumstances. But see discussions at 321 l'ARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser,) 861.
70 (1971) over an amendment which would have conditioned the obligation of trade
unionists on the "reasonable justification" for a strike. The issue in point during that
"presence or absence" discussion was the analogous one of strikes over unsafe working
conditions. The Lord Chancellor replied that the protection afforded by tile "just and
equitable standard," to be applied to remedies, gave far more protection than would
the amendatory language. Debate on § 36 generally focused on the Inequity of
forcing union officials to act as policemen and on the ambiguity of the phrase ' reason-
ably practical steps." See generally 810 PARL. DEn. H.C. (5th ser.) 1397-1419, 1466-1501
(1971); 822 PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 1493-1505 (1971).
263. See Gould, Judicial Review of Employment Discrimination Arbitration, Paper De-
livered to 25th Annual Meeting of the National Academy of Arbitrators, Boston, Mass,
April 7, 1972; Gould, Black Power in the Unions: The Impact Upon Collective liar.
gaining Relationships, 79 YALE L.J. 46 (1969); see, e.g., NLRB v. Tanner Motor Livery
Ltd., 419 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1969); The Emporium, 192 N.L.R.B. No. 19 (1971),
264. Thus § 101 provides that the NIRC if it finds an unfair industrial practice,
may grant compensation or prohibitory injunctions "if it considers that it would be
just and equitable to do so." In addition § 116 introduces the just and equitable
concept into the determination of the amount of such compensation. See 319 PAtL. DaB.
H.L. (5th ser.) 1358-74 (1971). Compare, in the United States, Mastro Plastic Corp. v.
NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956); Arlan's Department Store, 133 N.L.R.B. 802 (1961); Nat'l
Tea Co., 198 N.L.R.B. No. 62 (1972).
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4. Adjudication of the Act
The Act places exclusive jurisdiction for the interpretation of col-
lective agreements in the hands of the Industrial Relations Court
which is composed of both lawyers and lay people knowledgeable
about industrial relations. While Parliament did not provide any
grant of authority to the Court to fashion a law of contract for col-
lective agreements similar to what Mr. Justice Douglas was able to
extrapolate from Section 301 in Lincoln Mills,2 5 it is obvious that
the composition of the Court, and its charge to conduct itself in an in-
formal manner, means that special rules of law were anticipated. By
contrast, Section 301 places authority and confidence in courts which
are not specialized and not nearly so well equipped. Of course, in
reality, both before and after the Steelworkers Trilogy,200 most col-
lective agreement interpretation went to arbitration. In Britain the
framers of the Act contemplate a similar trend. Indeed, the Act gives
a boost to arbitration by encouraging the parties to devise their own
procedures on dismissals.2 67 This year's pact between the Trades
Union Congress and the Confederation of British Industry provid-
ing for conciliation and arbitration, may also be a step in the right
direction, although it is difficult at this point to say what role arbi-
tration will play in the mix. There is no corps of arbitrators ready
to be pressed into action, as was the case in the United States after
World War II, when War Labor Board personnel-both knowledge-
able and familiar to the parties-moved into private arbitration. When
the unions decide to participate with employers in making joint ap-
plications for "designating orders" permitting them to establish their
own unfair dismissal settlement machinery, arbitrators may begin to
appear on the British industrial relations scene.
How broadly the NIRC will construe the concept of collective
agreement is not clear. Written minutes which reflect agreements,
as well as documents which set forth "side" agreements or amend-
ments to existing contracts, will probably be included. A more diffi-
cult problem relates to oral contracts. On the one hand, one might
assume that the rules established by the Ford68 decision would argue
265. 355 U.S. 448 (1957).
266. See note 231 supra.
267. Ind. Rela. Act 1971, § 31. In neither country, however, is arbitration mandated by
statute. Such a mandate is given in the Railway Labor Act in the United States. 45
U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1970). See Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago R. & I.
Railroad Co., 353 U.S. 30 (1957). Note also that arbitration is specifically encouraged in
the United States by LMlRA § 203(d), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1970).
268. Ford Motor Co. v. A.U.E.F.WV., [1969] 2 Q.B. 303, which held collective agree-
ments not enforceable in a court of law. For the contrary view, argued persuasivcly,
see Selwyn, Collective Agreements and the Law, 32 MoP. L. RMv. 377 (1969). Selwyn
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against legal enforceability for such contracts. On the other hand, it
would appear that Parliament assumed that there might be a new
legal status for agreements not specifically covered by Section 34.
(That Section excludes from its coverage both oral contracts and
pre-1971 contracts.) After all, the Act repealed prospectively Section
4 of the Trade Union Act of 1871, 269 which had previously pre-
cluded the enforcement of agreements negotiated between unions and
employer associations. The Industrial Relations Act does not state
that agreements must be in writing or must be made subsequent to
the effective date of the Act to be enforceable. Accordingly, it is argu-
able that Parliament viewed such agreements as enforceable in the
courts.
5. Reminder on the American Experience
It is obviously difficult to predict whether, and to what degree,
the Act, and in particular its enforceability provisions, will lead to
comprehensive collective bargaining agreements, to acceptance of
arbitration as an institution, and to more centralized and responsible
national unions. To expect an immediate replication of American
practices would, however, be clearly naive. Americans often forget,
and the British fail to understand, that the law did not shape the
institutions which are at the heart of the industrial relations system
in this country. To be sure, the duty to bargain established by statute
in 1935 forced employers to come to the bargaining table where many
of them would not have done so without the law, and to some extent
the obligation to negotiate to the point of impasse over particular
subjects influences what items go into the contract.270 But grievance.
arbitration machinery in collective agreements, with some form of
no-strike pledge271 by the unions, was well on its way before the
Taft-Hartley amendments with Section 301 came on the scene. In-
deed, six years before the enactment of Section 301, the Supreme
Court held that the obligation to bargain in good faith includes the
requirement that both parties must reduce their agreement to writing
has since maintained that the NIRC will enforce agreements entered into prior to
passage of the Industrial Relations Act of 1971. N. SELWYN, GUIDE TO TIlE INDUSIRIAL
RELATIONS Acr, 1971, at 83-84 (1971). Compare the American law, as described in Stint1-
mers, Collective Agreements and the Law of Contracts, 78 YALE L.J. 529 (1969).
269. Ind. Rela. Act 1971, sched. 9.
270. See NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958); H. WELLINGTON, LAIIOK
AND THE LEGAL PRocEss 49-125 (1968).
271. See generally BuREAu or NATIONAL AFFAIRS, BASIC PATTERNS IN UNION CONIrActS
(1971).
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once they have reached accord.2 72 This legal doctrine facilitated the
negotiation of comprehensive and detailed contracts in writing. More-
over, the War Labor Board during World War II set the stage for
the more activist role which Congress, the Court, and arbitrators were
later to play.273 The Board encouraged and sometimes ordered the
use of grievance and no-strike clauses in contracts and familiarized the
parties with impartial arbitrators upon whom they might rely for the
interpretation of such documents. Accordingly, Section 301 as well as
the Court's holdings in Lincoln Mills, Steelworkers Trilogy and Boys
_Markets essentially reflect what the private parties, albeit operating
within a legal framework which did not hesitate to nudge them, had
done for themselves already. While the Court and Congress have since
become more activist, through the enactment of and interpretation
given to Taft-Hartley, and while it would appear that the rules of law
have thus had some impact on the parties' behavior, this impact has
never been measured with any exactitude.2 7-4 The promotion of arbi-
tration and of informal, non-legal procedures makes actual judicial in-
tervention infrequent.27 5 The American experience thus teaches that
law is most useful in ratifying prior trends, and that legal rights con-
tribute to industrial peace-but only when invoked as a last resort.
D. Secondary Boycotts
Section 98 of the Act makes it an unfair industrial practice to threaten
or engage in strikes or "irregular industrial action" against a dird per-
272. H.J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 514 (1914). The rule articulated in Heinz was
enacted in 1947, LMRA § 101, 29 US.C. § 158(d) (1970). Moreover, the NLRB has
held that a contract must be in writing to act as a contract bar to a rival union's
representation petition. Appalachian Shale Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 1160 (1958). The contract
must not only be written but also "comprehensive."
273. Frank and Edna Elkouri appraised the War Labor Board's effect in this w-ay:
A great impetus in the use of arbitration was given by the National War Labor
Board during World War II. The work of the Board constitutes an extensive me-
perience in the use of arbitration. It was created by executive order in 19-42 and
was given statutory authority by the War Labor Disputes Act in 1943. Most of the
20,000 labor dispute cases determined by the Board during the war emergency were
disputes over the terms of collective agreements. Of special importance was ihe
Board's policy of requiring the use of clauses providing for arbitration of future dis-
putes over the interpretation or application of the agreemeul This policy of the
Board laid the foundation for the popular practice today of teninating the con-
tract grievance procedure with the final step of arbitration.
F. ELKouRi & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKs 10 (1960). See also Freiden & Ulan,
Arbitration and the War Labor Board, 58 HARv. L. REV. 309 (1945).
274. Cf. H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 96-125 (1968).
275. Mr. Justice Brennan, speaking for the Court in Boys Market, where it was held
that injunctions could be issued by the courts in cases of strikes over arbitrable grievances,
reasoned that if the courts could enjoin stoppages and order arbitration of the under-
lying dispute, employers might be less tempted to sue for damages. Boys Market,
Inc. v. Local 770, Retail Clerks, 398 U.S. 235, 248 (1970).
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son who has entered into a contract with the primary employer,
where the purpose is to induce a breach of the contract or to prevent
the third person from performing it. Though phrased more specifical-
ly than its American counterpart in Section 8(b)(4) of the NLRA, Sec-
tion 98 presents the same concepts.270
The British secondary boycott provisions are defective in prohibiting
a union only from threatening or engaging in economic pressure to
break the commercial contract between the primary and secondary. As
American unions were quick to realize in 1947, there are more subtle
means available to bring pressure on a secondary, and the statute was
amended in 1959 to reach such methods.27 7 The Industrial Relations
Act is more narrowly drawn than the 1959 amendments, and this may
encourage union appeals to management which have the unlawful ob-
ject but which contain no threat of economic sanctions by the union.
Section 98(1)(c) states that the party whose commercial contract is
interfered with must be "extraneous" to the dispute. This seems a
formulation of the "ally" doctrine, a product of case law in the United
States.278 It is no easy task to determine when a secondary is an ally of
the primary and thereby without immunity from trade union action.
The ally doctrine permits unions to picket and encourage strikes
where the primary employer has farmed out or subcontracted work
that would have been performed, but for the strike, by primary em-
ployees. If unions could not take action against the secondary under
such circumstances, primary strikes could be broken easily. But what
is struck work? How substantial must be the benefit to the primary
from the subcontract to permit union action? To use the British statu-
tory language, how "material" must the support of the secondary be?
Does it matter when the subcontract was made-or whether or not the
subcontract can be justified on an economic basis unconnected with
276. In the United States, the Supreme Court has held that union pressure for an
unlawful object, i.e., to require a third party to cease doing business with a primary
employer, is found even where the pressure simply has the effect of disrupting the
business relationship. NLRB v. Local 825, Operating Engineers, 400 U.S. 297 (1971).
277. See note 3 supra. Under the 1947 amendments, the NLRA did not "speak
generally of secondary boycotts. It describes and condemns specific union conduct di.
rected to specific objectives. It forbids a union to strike against or to refuse to handle
goods . . . . Employees must be induced; they must be induced to engage in a strike
or concerted refusal. . . . A boycott voluntarily engaged in by a secondary employer
for his own business reasons is not covered by the statute." Mr. Justice Frankfurter for
the Court in Local 1976, United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners v. NLRB, 357
U.S. 93, 98-99 (1958). This situation was altered by the 1959 amendments. See NLRB v.
Servette, Inc., 376 U.S. 46 (1964).
278. See NLRB v. Business Machine & Office Appliance Mechanics Local 459, 228
F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 352 US. 962 (1956); Douds v. Architects, Engineers,
Chemists & Technicians Local 231, 75 F. Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
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the strike? These are but some of the questions left open, both in
America and in Great Britain..
2 79
A union breaks the British Act, only by "knowingly" inducing the
secondary employer to break its contract with the primary or, in the
absence of a full breach, by knowingly preventing performance of
the contract. But the Act does not state whether the secondary em-
ployer must also knowingly enter into the commercial contract, in
the sense of knowing about the industrial dispute between the union
and the primary. In the United States an employer can be viewed as
an ally of the primary by "unknowingly" performing strike work, if
the secondary might have reasonably ascertained that a labor dispute
was in progress..2 80 The Board has stated that the employer has the
"burden of determining whether he is engaged in neutral or ally
type work."
2 81
These problems aside, it seems unlikely that Britain will go through
the same painful twists and turns which have characterized American
labor law in the secondary boycott arena. In the first place, even in
this country, secondary boycott litigation is concentrated in the con-
struction and trucking industries-and, generally speaking, in areas of
work where the International Brotherhood of Teamsters represents
workers. Major industrial unions, like the United Auto Workers,
rarely, if ever, use the boycott. Second, as Bok has pointed out,282 sec-
ondary boycotts are less prevalent in a country like Britain where
bargaining is industry-wide and thus where replacements can rarely
be brought in to keep the primary enterprise operating. Nevertheless,
whatever the forum of bargaining, British strikes often occur on a
plant basis. But given British working class solidarity, workers thrown
out of work by a stoppage in another plant are not likely to break
ranks and move to replace their striking "brothers." In the United
States, where unions are less well organized in some industries, one
cannot always make the same confident estimate of worker loyalty.
Section 98(3) does attempt to answer some questions which are fre-
quently litigated in the United States. That subsection states, for in-
stance, that a party is not to be regarded as an ally "only" because it is
an employer who is "associated" with the primary or because it is "a
279. See generally Lesnick, Job Security and Secondary Boycotts: The Reach of
N.L.R.A. §§ 8(bX4) and S(e), 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1000 (1965); Lesnick, The Gra'einan of
the Secondary Boycott, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 1363 (1962).
280. Fox Valley Material Supplies Ass'n, 176 N.L.R.B. No. 51 (1969).
281. Id.
282. Bok, Reflections on the Distinctive Character of American Labor Laws, 84 HAMv.
L. REv. 1394, 1442-43 (1971).
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member of an organization of employers of which a party to the in-
dustrial dispute is also a member.' s28 3 Similarly, the fact that a party
has contributed to a fund established to defray losses in connection
with the labor dispute will not automatically establish the employer
as an ally. Where the contract between the secondary employer and
the primary was established prior to the time when the "industrial dis-
pute began," the secondary is not regarded as an ally. Presumably,
however, the way is open for the Industrial Court to inquire care.
fully into the circumstances surrounding the negotiations of the coin-
mercial agreement so as to determine whether the secondary had no-
tice or should have had notice of the impending industrial dispute.
The mere fact that the contract was entered into prior to the dispute
ought not to be conclusive, and it appears that Section 98(3)(d) of the
British law, like its American counterpart, intends no such result.
E. Emergency Dispute Procedures
Applications may be made by the Secretary of State to the Indus-
trial Court where industrial action has caused or would cause an in-
terruption in services "likely" to be "gravely injurious to the na-
tional economy, to imperil national security or to create a serious
risk of public disorder .... ,,2s4 An application may also be made where
283. For the American analogue on interference with the commercial contracts of
secondary employees and their employers, see NLRB v. Internat'l Rice Milling Co., 311
U.S. 665 (1951). The opposition in Britain not only expressed fears that this provlsion
of the statute would be a backdoor approach to curtailing all legitimate striing but
also argued that the clause as drawn was fundamentally unfair. This argtlnlett was
founded in part upon the fact that "associated employer" is defined in § 167(8) as a
company under the control of another company, either directly or indirectly, or under
the control of the same third person as another company. The argunent was that such
companies were not innocent and that combinations of employers for mutual support
were being allowed while combinations of workmen for mutual support were not.
See generally 811 PARL. DrB. H.C. (5th ser.) 1923-2005 (1971). Compare, e.g., J. C. Roy
& Sons Co. v. NLRB, 251 F.2d 771 (1st Cir. 1958); Local 46, Miami Newspaper Pressmen
v. NLRB, 322 F.2d 405 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
284. Ind. Rela. Act 1971, § 138(2)(c). Section 138 of the Act speaks of "Irregular
industrial action short of a strike" as a triggering mechanism for the emergency strike
procedures. In Secretary of State for Employment v. Aslef and Others, reported in The
Times (London), May 20, 1972, at 5, col. 3, the Court of Appeals held that a "working
to rule"-a sophisticated British version of the slowdown in which the employee strictly
adheres to rules not normally followed-constitutes irregular industrial action within
the meaning of the Act. (The NIRC decision is at [1972] 2 All E.R. 853.) This de.
cision will trouble British authorities like Professor Kahn-Freund who regard work
to rule as an "insoluble problem" for lawyers. See 0. KAHN-FREUND, LAtIOUt AND 'fit3
LAw 266-67 (1972). The decision in Aslef is significant because all of the anti.strike pro.
visions of the Act attempt to catch "irregular industrial action" and because "work
to rule" is a favorite tactic of British unions. Much of the debate surrounding this
whole section of the Act centered on the relative success or lack of success of the Amerl.
can Taft-Hartley procedure. See generally 812 PARL. DEis. H.C. (5th ser.) 665-732 (1971).
Concern was also expressed over removing control of such issues from Parliament and
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the dispute endangers the lives of a substantial number of individuals
or exposes many people to serious risk of disease or personal injury.
2 8
Although Section 138 differs superficially from Taft-Hartley in scope,
the latter statute covering only disputes which affect the national
"health and safety," the American cases interpreting the NLR.A. have
not yet established whether strikes injurious to the national economy,
and of massive dimension, may be enjoined as contrary to the national
health and safety. Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting in the one national
emergency dispute to reach the Court, stated that the majority ap-
plied a "material" well-being test to Taft-Hartley.280 Facially, how-
ever, the British statute is broader. The justification for this is that
the British economy is more open to, and dependent on, foreign trade;
strikes in export industries are thus more likely to affect directly the
nation's well-being than is the case in the United States.
The Industrial Court may, subsequent to receiving an application,
order the discontinuance of a strike or other form of industrial action
for a period not to exceed sixty days.28 7 This sixty-day "injunction"
parallels American law which, subsequent to the petition by the At-
torney General to a federal district court, allows the issuance of an in-
junction for a period of eighty days if the dispute affects the nation's
health and safety.
The most controversial portion of the emergency procedures, Sec-
tion 141, provides for a ballot by the workers where "there are rea-
sons for doubting whether the workers who are taking part or expect
to take part in the strike or other industrial action are or would be
taking part in accordance with their wishes, and whether they have
giving it to the courts. 322 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) 386-98 (1971). As for § 83(2) con-
cern was expressed that the standard "injurious to the national economy.., etc." was
too vague and hence prone to abuse. See, e.g., 812 PARL. DEn. H.C. (5th scr.) 689-700;
721-24; 322 PARL. DB. H.L. (5th ser.) 399-408 (1971). This argunment was answered by
the Solicitor General, at 812 PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 708-12 (1971).
285. Ind. Rela. Act 1971, § 138(2)(b). British emergency strike powers, such as
they were prior to the 1971 Act, were contained in the Emergency Powers Act of 1920.
However, that statute was more narrowly geared to essential services and prosided for
the requisitioning of troops, goods and property and the control of prices rather than
for strike injunctions.
286. United Steelworkers v. United States, 361 U.S. at 62-77. Some of the recent
American cases indicate that the meaning of "health and safety" is not defined with
clarity as of this time. See, e.g., United States v. Local 418, ILA, 78 L.R.R.M. 2801 (7th
Cir. 1971); United States v. Longshoremen, 79 L.R.R.M. 30-13 (S.D. Ga. 1971).
287. Ind. Rela. Act 1971, § 139(l)(c). The relative success of the Taft-Hartle) cooling-
off procedure was cited by the government as support for instituting sudl a plan in
Britain. However, the government opted for a plan with no mandatory "best offer"
vote because of an evaluation that thts element of the American Taft-Hartle), procedure
was more conducive to heightened tensions than to settlement. See 812 PAt.. DEB. H.C.
(5th ser.) 687-88 (1971).
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had an opportunity to indicate their wishes in this respect . .. .,9-2
The Court of Appeal has already held that the Minister himself is
only required to have the doubts and the burden is upon the op.
posing party to show that a reasonable man could not have doubts on
this question.28 9 Unlike Taft-Hartley which provides for a ballot fif-
teen days prior to the expiration of the eighty-day injunction on the
employer's last offer, the Industrial Relations Act permits the Secre-
tary of State to order a ballot at his discretion. That there is nothing
automatic about the process is fortunate, for American experience
indicates that ballot procedures weaken emergency dispute legislation.
The American legislation was predicated upon the notion that the
rank-and-file in many instances are more reasonable than their leaders.
In fact, however, the rank-and-file are typically more militant than the
leadership, and despite the fact that the British Ford workers under-
cut union leaders in a ballot procedure in 1970,20 all indications are
that British workers will also put pressure upon, rather than tamely
follow, their leaders. In the 1972 railway strike the Government
sought a ballot and achieved the same result as do the American au-
thorities, i.e., rejection of the offer.2 91 In the United States, the ballot
procedure has made the emergency pause a time for heating up rather
than cooling off. Union leaders and the rank and file see the ballot
as a vote of confidence for union leadership. The bargaining position
of the parties becomes frozen as they posture for advantage.
Another major weakness of emergency strike provisions is that the
parties come to rely upon them to "save the day." This stultifies col.
288. Ind. Rela. Act 1971, § 141(c). Section 143 prohibits economic pressure from
the time the 6allot is ordered by the Industrial Court until the result is reported to
the court. The Secretary of State can apply for such a ballot if he has the doubt re-
ferred to in the text, and if in addition it appears to him there are or will be risks
to the national economy or security, public order, or people's lives, or risks to the liveli.
hood of a substantial number of workers in the industry involved. Id. § 1,11(2). The
first of these tests derives from the emergency cooling-off order section. T'he second Is
unique to the ballot section and was seriously questioned in the debates. In addition,
concern was expressed that such a ballot procedure would be more conducive to
heightened tensions than to resolution of disputes. On the standard for the test re-
garding effect on livelihood see 322 PARL. DEa. H.L. (5th ser.) 413-16 (1971). On the
absence of court review of the secretary's doubts, and possible CIR involvement in
the ballot order procedure, see 320 PARa.. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) 315-19 (1971), dealing
with § 142, which is the section providing for ballot orders pursuant to a 141 appllta-
tion. See also 322 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) 421-26 (1971). Though there is a sixty day
limit on cooling-off periods under § 139, the Industrial Court determines the period
within which ballot results are to be reported to the court, and concern was expressed
that this extends the cooling-off periods, given that no limit is placed on the ballot
period. See 320 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) 328-34 (1971).
289. Secretary of State for Employment v. Aslef and Others, supra note 284. Both
American and British law place primary interpretive authority in the hands of the
executive branch of government.
290. See Routledge, Ford Strike Rejected in Mass Vote, The Times (London), Feb.
16, 1970, at 1, col. 2.
291. The Times (London), June 1, 1972, at 15, col. 1.
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lective bargaining. Moreover, the remedy, i.e., injunction, is one-sided
relief, inequitable from the union's point of view, even where the
status quo is preserved. These factors have prompted scholars to pro-
pose a "choice of procedures" approach which would provide the
government with more flexibility and a wide variety of weapons to
be used in different situations.292 Under this approach, the parties
would be uncertain what would happen in the event government in-
tervened, an uncertainty which might encourage them to resolve their
problems on their own. Under the related "final offer" approach, both
parties would make a final offer representing their true and uncom-
promisable positions and, after mediation of remaining issues, an
arbitrator would be compelled to pick between the two offers.2913 The
arbitrator would have to select one of the two in 1oto, thus encourag-
ing the parties to make reasonable offers or to settle voluntarily.
20
On balance, however, the Taft-Hartley procedures have been suc-
cessful.2 95 Before the two longshore strikes of 1971, the provision had
been invoked only'twenty-nine times since 1947.290 Strikes had actually
taken place in twenty-four instances. Of these twenty-four, sixteen
have been settled without resort to another stoppage, thirteen during
the eighty-day cooling-off period. The statistics show that Taft-Hartley
works reasonably well; its provisions are accepted by trade unionists
today and proposed by them as ari acceptable alternative to an un-
qualified right to strike in public employment disputes. While the
British labor unions are just as upset today with the sixty-day cooling-
292. Wirtz, The "Choice of Procedures" Approach to National Emergency Disputes,
in EMERGENCY DISPUTES AND NATIONAL POLICY 159 (1. Bernstein, H. Enarson & R. Flem-
ing eds. 1955); A. Cox, LAw AND THE NATIONAL LABOR POLICY 48-63 (1960).
293. This approach was embodied in R. NIXON, RECO.N DATON S AND PnOrosA.S TO
DEAL WITH NATIONAL EMERGENCY LABOR DISPUTES, Doe. No. 91-266, 91st Cong., 2d Scss.,
March 2, 1970 [hereinafter cited as RECOMiENDATIONS]. However, a recent version of the
proposal has been withdrawn. Bernstein, Nixon Switch on Anti-Strihe Bill Seen as Bid for
Labor Support, Los Angeles Times, July 21, 1972, at 1, col. 1.
294. "[W]hen the final offer selection is the ultimate recourse, the disputants will
compete to make the most reasonable and realistic final offer, one which will have
the best chance to win the panel's endorsement." RECO.M.M.E.%NDATIONS, supra note 293, at
p. 4. See also Silberman, National Emergency Disputes-The Considerations Behind a
Legislative Proposal, 4 GEORGIA L. REV. 673 (1970). The final offer procedure has,
however, several possible defects: (1) The union may be less able to compromise once
its offer is made public, and this may encourage employers to offer less than they
otherwise might. (2) The parties may hold back compromises until the final offer, in which
case final offers will diverge by large margins. (3) It may be very difficult for a side
to put together a reasonable final offer without knowledge of the other party's posi-
tion on all the unresolved issues. (4) The "win or lose" nature of the procedure would
not seem conducive to good relations between the parties during the term of the agree-
ment.
295. On the success of Taft-Hartley generally, see pp. 1421-23 supra.
296. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1633, NATIONAL
EMERGENCY DISPUTES, LABOR-MANAGE.M.ENT RELATIONS (TAFT-HARTLEY) Aer 1947-68.
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off provisions contained in the Industrial Relations Act as were their
American counterparts twenty-five years ago, their fears may well be
as unfounded.
Conclusion
In selectively borrowing from American law, the drafters of the
Industrial Relations Act have made some advantageous choices, and
a few unfortunate ones. In determining appropriate bargaining units,
the British have supplied detailed criteria in the Act and in the Code
of Practice, while the American statute leaves details to the NLRB,
but the concepts are similar, and should prove workable. Like the
NLRA, the British Act sensibly permits the parties to establish volun-
tary machinery for settlements. The Act's dismissal provisions, for in-
stance, specifically encourage the parties to fashion their own pro.
cedures, and further-if inadvertent-encouragement is supplied by the
Act's crusty refusal to impose reinstatement as a statutory remedy for
wrongful dismissal. By permitting the parties to have unenforceable
agreements, and by relying on a "best endeavors" theory of union
liability when the agreement is enforceable, the Act allows the parties
to adapt their relationships to change in a gradual and orderly man-
ner. As a last resort, the Commission on Industrial Relations is use-
fully empowered to impose grievance machinery on the parties. The
Act also promises to rationalize trade union structures and practices.
The recognition machinery should bring the unions and their stewards
together in one bargaining panel. The duty to bargain, the presump-
tion of enforceability, and the system of registration, which requires
unions to identify their responsible officers, should bring the leader-
ship into the workplace and should thus foster negotiation of compre-
hensive collective agreements.
On the other hand, the union security provisions are either ir-
relevant or inimical to the Act's larger purposes. Prohibiting the
closed shop will hardly help unions to discipline and control their
members and stewards, as Heaton requires. There is no justification
for the stringent vote procedures necessary to obtain an agency shop.
In America, union security elections have proved largely a waste of
time. In Britain, where the tradition of union security is more deeply
rooted, the voting procedures may cause unnecessary bitterness in the
Act's early years.
Two other major flaws in the Act contributed directly to last sum.
mer's turmoil. The controversial provision for contempt sanctions
against individuals was used to jail the shop stewards in the Heaton
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case after the Court of Appeals held that the national union was not
responsible for their actions and could not thus be sanctioned by
sequestration of union property. As soon as the House of Lords re-
versed the Court of Appeals in Healon, the Industrial Court quite
properly released the stewards, since future contempt could be dealt
with by sanctions against the union itself. But the stewards had by
then been martyred, and the labor movement's resistance to the Act
had hardened, perhaps irreversibly. Second, the Government foolishly
relied on the emergency strike ballot procedure during the acri-
monious railway dispute. Predictably, the rank-and-file rallied to the
leadership, and negotiations made no progress during the emergency
pause. The Government had wasted the one asset possessed in the
Act's emergency provisions and not contained in Taft-Hartley, i.e.,
the discretion not to hold a strike ballot.
Amendment of the Act seems certain. No legislation so compre-
hensive and detailed can escape change. 20 - The Government has an-
nounced its intention to consider amendments sometime within the
next year.298 The Labor Party insists on complete repeal. The TUG,
encouraged by the Government's tactical blunders, believes that
Prime Minister Heath can be forced to back down on the whole
subject of labor legislation, just as the Wilson Government was suc-
cessfully pressured in June of 1969.299 While thus far rejecting left
Wing exhortations to refuse to appear defensively before the NIRG, 300
the TUC remains ready to expel unions which comply with the Act's
registration provisions.301 The TUC's position may be strong, in part
because the Government needs union cooperation on wage restraint
297. The history of American labor legislation has, for instance, been one of sub-
stantial amendment.
298. Bourne, Offer to Unions of Deal Over I.R.A. Act May Be Considered, The Fin-
ancial Times (London), August 7, 1972, at 1, col. 3.
299. See Routledge. TUC To Fight for Drastic Change in the Industrial Relations
Act, The Times (London), September 4, 1972, at 1, col. 1; see Elliott. The TUC Takes
Stock of its Labour Law Campaign, The Financial Times (London), September ,1, 1972.
at 10, col. 3; The Times (London), August 3, 1972, at 17, col. 1.
300. Elliott, TUG "Left" Unite in All-Out Opposition to the JR Act, The Financial
Times (London) September 4, 1972, at 1, col. 2.
301. The Seamen's Union seems prepared to litigate the question of whethcr the
T.U.C. may lawfully suspend or expel unions because they seek access to the Act's
institutions, i.e., because they seek to register with the Registrar. Routledge, Seamen's
Union May Sue General Council, The Times (London), Sept. 5. 1972, at 1, col. 1. For
the American position on this subject, see NLRB v. Marine & Shipbuilding Workers of
America, 391 U.S. 418 (1968). But see Local 4028, Unitcd Steelworkers, 154 NL.R.B. 692
(1965), enforced, 373 F-2d 443 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 90 (1968), which
indicates that the general rule protecting employees against expulsion for filing unfair
labor practice complaints is not applicable where the filing of decertification petitions
prompts the discipline. Query to what extent this is analogous to the British case where
unions may compete more effectively with other TUC affiliates by utilizing tile Act's
recognition and union security machinery.
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if the current inflation is to be halted. At the same time, that strength
may be eroded if enough unions resist the TUC's edict against regis-
tration. The prospect of a rival labor federation of registered unions
is not entirely beyond the realm of possibility at this time.3 02 If such
a federation develops, one can anticipate extensive attempts by each
to "raid" or "poach" the members of the other.
3 3
In the end, whatever amendments are adopted, the Act will not
succeed without the consent and cooperation of the governed. Em.
ployers must learn to rely on the Act's machinery only as a last resort;
a continued absence of effective voluntary institutions and procedures
to settle disputes will undermine the Act as certainly as would a con-
tinued labor boycott. For their part, union leaders might review the
American experience. In the years after Taft-Hartley's enactment,
American unions forecast a flood of anti-union contract litigation,
sponsored by employers colluding with misbehaving union members
and non-unionists, whom the union would be powerless to discharge.
The unions resolved to avoid enforceable contracts and to refrain from
no-strike obligations. Nothing came of all this, largely because arbitra.
tion supplanted the judiciary as the principal forum to hear disputes
arising during the term of the agreement. Arbitration is both a form
of adjudication and an extension of the collective bargaining process.
Its widespread adoption in Britain would reduce reliance on the NIRC.
The transplanting of no other American institution or technique offers
greater promise of effectuating the ultimate purposes of the British
Act.
The experience of America is that law cannot coerce where re-
sistance is unyielding, but that it can shape attitudes and, ultimately,
conduct. Brown v. Board of Education,30 4 despite all the difficulties
of its implementation, has altered opinions about integration, and
some practices are changing in consequence. There may be 'nore
"summers of '72" in Britain's future. But that country still enjoys a
better reputation for respecting law than does America, and the In-
dustrial Relations Act-if sensibly amended-therefore retains a decent
chance to achieve some of its central objectives.
302. See Elliott, E.P.T.U. in Big Row at the TUC, The Financial Times (London), Sept,
7, 1972, at 1, col. 3; Routledge, Electricians' Union May Quit the Congress, The Times
(London), Sept. 7, 1972, at 1, col. 7.
303. See Torode, T.U.C. Cuts Off 32 Rebel Unions, The Manchester Guardianl
Weekly, Sept. 9, 1972, at 10, col. 1, where it is reported that the protection from raiding
afforded by the Bridlington Agreement would be withdrawn from suspended tuiong.
See also Elliott, TUG Suspends 32 Rebel Unions, The Financial Times (London), Sept, 5,
1972, at 1, col. 3. The prospect is that a rival union federation would use the Act's
machinery to fight back against T.U.C. affiliates.
304. 347 US. 483 (1954).
1486
Vol. 81: 1421, 1972
